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Abstract
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging computer network paradigm and repre-
sents one of the most promising technologies to simplify network management and configu-
ration through increased network programmability and abstraction. In contrast to traditional
networks, in SDN, the control plane, which makes decisions on how to forward traffic, is
separated from the data plane, which transmits traffic to selected destinations. That makes
network control (via the SDN controller) more programmable, dynamic and centralised. With
the higher level of abstraction that SDN provides, network administrators can more eas-
ily configure network services and manage traffic flows without having to configure a large
number of individual network devices (switches and routers). The great potential of SDN has
led to significant deployments in data centres, wide area networks, etc., and it is growing at
a rapid pace.
Security is a critical aspect of networking in general and is particularly vital in SDN. Due to
its fundamentally new architecture, SDN presents new potential security vulnerabilities and
risks. Security in SDN has not received much attention yet, given that it is very distinct and
unique.
The goal of this PhD was to address this gap and analyse the security of the SDN infras-
tructure, identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and propose corresponding solutions and
improvements. The focus was on the fundamental aspects and components of SDN, in
particular the building blocks of the control plane components include Topology Discovery,
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Handling and Virtualisation Layer. Finally, the thesis
thoroughly explored and investigated the most common and effective attacks against the
SDN architecture.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In traditional networks, the deployment and management of infrastructure and services is
a complex task and requires the configuration of a large number of individual network de-
vices such as routers and switches, typically via proprietary interfaces. Packet forwarding
is controlled via complex, distributed routing protocols such as OSPF [7], BGP and EGP
[8]. The lack of a centralised global view of the network state, as well as the lack of rele-
vant networking abstractions, make it challenging to implement high-level forwarding policies
in traditional IP networks. As a result, the network is configured rather than programmed,
making innovation and the deployment of new networking services difficult and slow [9, 10].
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a relatively new approach to manage and configure
computer networks, which aims to address this problem through removing the control intelli-
gence from forwarding elements, such as switches and routers, and placing it in a logically
centralised node, i.e. the SDN controller [11, 12]. The separation of the control plane and
the data plane in SDN makes the network more programmable. The complex and labour-
intensive task of configuring individual networking devices is now replaced by the simpler
and more efficient task of ’programming’ the network.
In SDN, the Network Operating System (NOS) hides the complexity and details of the under-
lying network infrastructure, by providing an abstraction layer and clearly defined interfaces.
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Network services and policies are implemented as applications that sit on top of the Network
Operating System, running on the centralised controller. The controller communicates with
the forwarding elements, i.e. the data plane, through a well-defined interface, e.g. the
OpenFlow protocol [13].
As a result of the separation of the control plane and the data plane as well as the increased
level of abstraction, SDN make the network more agile, flexible and programmable, which
dramatically simplifies network management and configuration, and enables faster innova-
tion. The implementation and deployment of new network services and policies, which take
a considerable amount of time and effort in traditional networks, becomes a comparatively
manageable task in an SDN-enabled network.
SDN has gained tremendous momentum, both in the industry and the research community,
and has been successfully deployed in data centres and Wide Area Networks (WANs) [14].
For example, Google has deployed an SDN-based WAN in its internal backbone network
to globally connect its various data centres. As a result, network performance has been
enhanced dramatically, and the link utilisation has increased from 30 ∼ 40% to close to
100% [14]. This dramatic achievement came from the more fine-grained control over the
forwarding of network flows, and the increased network programmability provided by SDN.
It is likely that the growth of SDN will continue in the future, which is supported by the fact
that major networking vendors such as Cisco [15], Huawei [16], Juniper [17] and Hewlett
Packard [18] are increasingly supporting SDN-based products.
The fundamentally different approach to network management and configuration of SDN
has significant implications for network security. There are two separate aspects of this. In
the first one, to which we refer to as ’Security via SDN’, the logically centralised view and
programmability of SDN makes it easier to implement and enforce network-wide security
policies.
The second security aspect of SDN, which we refer to as ’Security of SDN’, considers the
security of SDN platform itself, and is the focus of this PhD. Our hypothesis is that a funda-
mentally different network architecture such as SDN is likely to have new security vulnerabil-
ities and provides a new range of attack vectors, and that past work on security in traditional
networks cannot fully capture the security aspects of SDN.
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The goal of this thesis was to analyse the security of the SDN architecture, components and
services, and to identify security risks and vulnerabilities. A further goal was to practically
demonstrate the feasibility of attacks, discuss and quantify their potential impact, and if
possible, propose suitable countermeasures.
The security analysis in this thesis focuses on the following key SDN components, services
and aspects: Topology Discovery, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Handling and Net-
work Virtualisation. Furthermore, the thesis also specifically considers the problem of Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks against the SDN platform and their potential impact. The corre-
sponding research contributions are summarised in the following.
1.2 Research Contributions
1.2.1 Security of Topology Discovery
Topology discovery is a core service in SDN, and it underpins most network applications
such as routing, access control, etc., by providing a global view of the network and the ab-
straction of the network as a graph. All major SDN controllers implement topology discovery
using the OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP), making it the de-facto standard for topology
discovery in SDN [19].
OFDP uses the packet format of the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) used in traditional
Ethernet networks [20], but operates completely differently. Given its important role in SDN,
a security analysis of the OFDP protocol is essential for ensuring the overall security of any
SDN platform.
In this thesis, key vulnerabilities of SDN’s current topology discovery approach are identified,
which are mostly due to the lack of authentication and integrity protection of LLDP packets.
A link spoofing attack is discussed, implemented and experimentally evaluated, where an
attacker can successfully corrupt the controller’s topology view of the network by injecting a
fabricated LLDP packet. The impact of this attack on higher level services is discussed and
demonstrated via the example of routing.
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The thesis proposes a countermeasure, which can prevent this type of attack, based on
the addition of a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) at the controller, which
provides integrity protection for LLDP messages. We show that our approach is not vulner-
able to replay attacks. Using experiments, we also quantify the computational cost of the
proposed security mechanism.
1.2.2 Security of ARP
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used in computer networks to map an interface’s
network layer address (typically IP), to its corresponding Layer 2 or Media Access Control
(MAC) address [21]. The vulnerability of ARP to spoofing attacks is a well-known problem
in traditional computer networks [22], mostly due to its stateless nature, and lack of authen-
tication and integrity protection. ARP spoofing attacks form a critical building block for a lot
of Denial of Service (DoS), and Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [23, 24].
In this thesis, we consider ARP security from the specific perspective of SDN, in particular
its centralised control, which allows new approaches to ARP handling and providing security
for ARP. We initially demonstrate the vulnerability of current SDN platforms to ARP spoofing
attacks via experiments, for different approaches to ARP handling used in SDN, i.e. Regular
ARP and Proxy ARP.
We then investigate Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) [25], an ARP spoofing protection mech-
anism used in traditional IP networks, and explore its adoption to SDN. We show that DAI
can prevent ARP spoofing attacks in SDN, and we experimentally evaluate its overhead on
the SDN control plane. DAI relies on the availability of a trusted database of IP-to-MAC ad-
dress mappings. Such a database is not always available, and we, therefore, explore a new
method to secure ARP without such a requirement. The newmethod presented in this thesis,
called SARP_NAT, does not assume any trusted a-priori information of IP-to-MAC address
mappings and leverages SDN’s centralised control plane. The basic idea of SARP_NAT is
to prevent any potentially spoofed ARP information from coming into contact with end-hosts
and ARP handling components at the controller, and hence prevents the poisoning of the
corresponding ARP caches and databases. This is achieved by implementing a controller
component, which ’sanitises’ ARP requests and replies by overwriting potentially spoofed
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fields. We demonstrate the viability of this new, SDN specific approach of securing ARP,
and present extensive experimental evaluations of its performance and cost.
1.2.3 Efficient ARP Handling
ARP handling in SDN is typically an expensive operation, depending on which approach is
chosen, i.e. Regular ARP or Proxy ARP. In the case of Regular ARP, significant network
bandwidth is required to broadcast ARP request messages in the network whereas Proxy
ARP imposes a significant computational load on the control plane since the SDN controller
handles ARP requests.
We developed a new OpenFlow-based approach for handling ARP in SDN, which achieves
much greater efficiency by offloading the task of answering ARP request to the data plane,
i.e. the SDN switches. Our experiments show that this approach significantly reduces the
time required to handle ARP requests, and significantly reduces the load on the SDN con-
troller, compared to the current state-of-the-art approach.
While this contribution is more of a general nature, and not exclusively focussed on secu-
rity, it does have important security implications and benefits. By significantly reducing the
load of the SDN controller, we can make the controller, and therefore the entire network,
less vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 6.
1.2.4 Evaluation of Denial of Service Attacks
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a common problem in traditional networks. According
to [26], the estimated annual cost of the impact of DoS attacks is US $113 billion globally.
SDN, with its logically centralised control plane, represents a unique target for DoS attacks.
If an attacker manages to disable the controller, the entire network can be disrupted.
In this thesis, we provide an extensive experimental evaluation of the impact of DoS attacks
on different SDN controller platforms. We also consider the impact of the attacks on the
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data plane, i.e. SDN switches. Our results show that an attacker, with relatively minimal
effort, can significantly disrupt modern SDN controllers, and their ability to forward legitimate
network traffic.
1.2.5 Security of Network Virtualisation
Network virtualisation is a highly desirable feature in today’s large-scale computer systems,
in particular in data centres. One of the key benefits of SDN is that it enables network
virtualisation. Using network virtualisation, multiple SDN controllers can share the same
physical network infrastructure. Network virtualisation is widely used in SDN, and the most
relevant SDN hypervisors are FlowVisor [27] and OpenVirteX [28]. With the new potential
that network virtualisation in SDN brings, they also represent a potential for new security
vulnerabilities.
In this thesis, we present a first extensive evaluation and analysis of the security of the
network virtualisation layer in SDN, with a focus on FlowVisor and OpenVirteX. By using
code analysis and fuzz testing [29], we found a number of new, critical security vulnerabilities
in FlowVisor and OpenVirteX. We show how an attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to
break the isolation between virtual networks, and how a node on one virtual network can
successfully disrupt another virtual network, or in some cases, completely disable the entire
network. From our results, we can conclude that significant further efforts are required to
guarantee the security of SDN hypervisors.
1.3 Research Methodology
The research methodology used in this thesis for the evaluation of various security aspects
of SDN is largely experimental. This section provides a summary of the software tools, and
platforms that formed the basis of our experimental evaluation.
A key platform used for most of our experiments is Mininet [30], a Linux-based network
emulator. Mininet allows the creation of a network of virtual SDN switches and hosts, con-
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nected via virtual links. An important advantage of Mininet is the ability to run real network
code, which allows experiments to be easily transferred to hardware SDN test-beds. Mininet
uses Open vSwitch (OVS) [31], a popular and widely supported software OpenFlow switch.
Some of our experiments have also been replicated on a hardware SDN test-bed. For this,
we used the OFELIA test-bed [32], a federated experimental SDN facility shared between a
number of SDN islands across various European countries (e.g. UK, Switzerland, Germany,
Belgium, Spain, and Italy), as well as Brazil. Each island is equipped with a range of SDN
hardware switches, supporting the OpenFlow 1.0 standard [2]. The model of the OFELIA
switches used in all our experiments was NEC IP8800//S3640-24T2XW. We used the re-
sources located at the OFELIA island in Trento, Italy. The SDN controller platforms used in
this thesis include POX [33], Ryu [34], ONOS [35], FloodLight [36], and OpenDaylight [37].
To implement and analyse different SDN security attacks, we used a range of software
tools, such as Scapy [38], Dsniff [39], PackETH [40], Tcpreplay [41], Stress-ng [42], and
Netcat [43]. Table 8.2 shows a summary of the key software tools that were used for the
experimental evaluations conducted in this thesis.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The structure of the remainder of this thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides the relevant background on Software Defined Networks, OpenFlow
and network security.
• Chapter 3 presents a general overview of the most relevant works on SDN security.
The works that are more specifically related to each of the specific contributions pre-
sented in this thesis are discussed in more detail in the corresponding chapters.
• Chapter 4 presents our security analysis of SDN’s current topology discovery mecha-
nism, as well as the implementation and evaluation of our proposed improvements.
• Chapter 5 presents the security analysis of ARP handling in SDN, as well as our pro-
posed countermeasures against ARP spoofing attacks.
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Table 1.1: Software Tools used for Implementation Experiments in the Thesis
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.1.0-2.2.2
Open vSwitch [31] Software SDN Switch 2.0.2-2.6.1
OFELIA [32] Hardware SDN Test-bed =======
POX [33] SDN Controller Platform dart branch
Ryu [34] SDN Controller Platform 3.19-3.22
ONOS [35] SDN Controller Platform 1.8.5-1.11.1
Floodlight [36] SDN Controller Platform 1.0
OpenDaylight [37] SDN Controller Platform Carbon SR1
Scapy Library [38] Packet Manipulation Tool 2.2.0
Dsniff Package [39] Network Sniffing Tool 2.4
PackETH [40] Packet Generator 1.8.1
Tcpreplay [41] Traffic Replay Tool 4.2.6
Stress-ng [42] Control Traffic Tool 0.02.26
Netcat [43] Network Sniffing Tool 5.59BETA1
VM-VirtualBox [44] Oracle Virtualisation 5.0.10
• Chapter 6 introduces a new, efficient approach to handle ARP in SDN.
• Chapter 7 presents an evaluation of the impact of DoS attacks against the control and
data plane in SDN.
• Chapter 8 presents new security vulnerabilities in the two most relevant SDN virtuali-
sation platforms and experimentally demonstrates their impact.
• Chapter 9 concludes the thesis and provides directions for potential future work.
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Background
2.1 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new approach to managing computer networks and
has recently gained tremendous momentum [45]. One of the essential concepts of the SDN
technology is the separation of the control plane from the data plane. The control plane
(intelligence), which determines how network packets are being forwarded, is removed from
the data plane, which is responsible for the actual forwarding of packets. The network control
function is (logically) centralised in an entity called the SDN controller that allows network
operators to programmatically configure network behaviour and directly manage the entire
network elements from a single management point [46, 47]. This concept facilitates network
evolution, boosts innovation processes, automates network management, and optimise net-
work configurations.
The conceptual architecture of SDN, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, consists of three layers
(infrastructure layer, control layer and application layer). The bottom layer, i.e. the infrastruc-
ture layer, is basically a set of forwarding elements, i.e. SDN switches, which provide basic
packet forwarding functionality based on decisions made by the control layer, i.e. forwarding
rules provided by the SDN controller.
The middle layer is the control layer, consisting of a logically centralised SDN controller, im-
plementing the functionality of a Network Operating System (NOS) [48]. The NOS deals with
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Figure 2.1: Software Defined Network Architecture [1]
and hides the distributed nature of the physical network, and provides the abstraction of a
network graph to higher layer services, which sit at the application layer of the SDN archi-
tecture [49]. This abstraction makes the network much more programmable and simplifies
the implementation and deployment of new network services and applications. The SDN
controller manages and configures individual SDN switches by installing forwarding rules,
via the so-called southbound interface. The predominant standard for this is OpenFlow,
which allows the SDN controller to manipulate forwarding rules of the OpenFlow switches
[2]. OpenFlow is discussed further in the next section.
At the top of the SDN architecture is the application layer, where high-level network policy
decisions are defined and applications and services such as Traffic Engineering (TE), rout-
ing, firewalling, etc., are implemented. The interface between the application layer and the
control layer is referred to as the northbound interface. In contrast to the southbound in-
terface, there is currently no well-established standard for this, and different SDN controller
platforms support different APIs [1, 10, 45, 46].
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Figure 2.2: OpenFlow Switch Components [2]
2.1.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is the predominant southbound interface protocol for SDN. It provides the inter-
face between the infrastructure layer and the control layer as shown in Figure 2.1, which
allows the SDN controller to talk to the forwarding elements (switches). The OpenFlow stan-
dard is maintained by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF). OpenFlow is a wire protocol
that allows the SDN controller to manipulate network traffic across the forwarding elements,
i.e. via decisions that are translated into forwarding rules and actions. It also allows switches
to notify the controller about special events, e.g. the receipt of a packet that does not match
any installed rules [13]. The OpenFlow specification has evolved from version 1.0 to the
current version 1.5 at the time of writing this thesis.
The core components of an OpenFlow switch that perform a packet lookup and forwarding
operation are illustrated in Figure 2.2. They consist of one flow table (in the case of Open-
Flow switch v1.0) or more flow tables in a pipeline (in the case of OpenFlow switch v1.2 -
v1.5), a group table, and an OpenFlow channel, connecting the switch to an external SDN
controller.
OpenFlow switches are assumed to be configured with the IP address and TCP port num-
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Figure 2.3: Main Components of OpenFlow Entry
ber of their assigned SDN controller. At initialisation, switches contact the SDN con-
troller, via this address and port, and establish a secure Transport Layer Security (TLS)
connection. As part of the initial protocol handshake, the controller sends an OpenFlow
OFPT_FEATURES_REQUEST message to each OpenFlow switch, requesting configura-
tion information, including the number of switch ports and corresponding MAC addresses
[50]. This initial handshake informs the controller of the existence of the nodes (switches) in
the network, but it does not provide any information about the active inter-switch links, i.e.
the network topology. Gathering this information is the role of OFDP, which will be discussed
in more detail later.
As mentioned above, OpenFlow allows controllers to access and configure the forwarding
rules, i.e. flow entries in the flow tables at SDN switches. These rules, which provide
fine-grained control over how packets are forwarded through the network, can be installed
reactively as a response to received packets, or proactively. Each forwarding rule consists
of three main parts: Match fields (rules), Action (instructions), and Statistics (counters), as
shown in Figure 2.3.
• The Match fields are basically the selectors that OpenFlow switches rely on to filter
incoming packets. The supported match fields include the switch ingress port and
various packet header fields, such as IP source and destination address, MAC source
and destination address, UDP/TCP source and destination port number and more, as
shown in the figure. The value of the header fields can be either fixed or set as wild-
cards, i.e. made to match any value [12, 46].
• The Action field defines how packets that match specified match field values are
12
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treated. The main actions supported by an OpenFlow switch include forwarding a
packet on a particular switch port, dropping the packet, enqueuing the packet and or
modifying the value of a specific field. Switch ports can either be physical ports or
one of the following virtual port types: ALL (sends the packet out on all physical ports,
except the ingress port), CONTROLLER (sends the packet to the SDN controller),
FLOOD (same as ALL, excluding the ports disabled by the spanning tree protocol)
[1, 9].
• The Statistics field is typically a collection of counters, which can be per table, flow,
port, and queue to count how many packets and bytes passing through the switch
match this forwarding rule.
• The Priority field defines the matching precedence of the forwarding rule. For example,
a forwarding rule with a high priority is executed before the rest.
• The Timeout field specifies the idle and maximum time of the forwarding rule before it
is removed from the flow table.
• The Cookie field is data value selected by the controller and may be used to filter flow
statistics and flow modification.
OpenFlow switches support a basic match-action paradigm, where each incoming packet is
matched against a set of rules, and the corresponding action or action list is executed. The
default behaviour of OpenFlow switches is to send the packet to the controller when it does
not match any of the rules.
To send a data packet to the SDN controller, an OpenFlow switch encapsulates the packet
in an OpenFlow Packet-In message. OpenFlow also supports an OpenFlow Packet-Out
message, via which the SDN controller can send a data packet to an OpenFlow switch,
together with instructions (action list) on how to forward the packet [13, 46].
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Figure 2.4: Classification of Network Security Attacks
2.2 Network Security
Network security is concerned with providing the core properties of secure communications,
such as confidentiality, integrity and availability [51]. In this context, confidentially aims to
ensure that network services and information are only accessible to authorised users, while
integrity aims to prevent unauthorised modification and deletion of data traversing the net-
work. Availability refers to the guaranteed and reliable access to the information and services
by authorised people.
A key tool to implement network security is cryptography, in which electronic data is en-
crypted in a particular form that makes the data only accessible to authorised entities. En-
cryption provides confidentiality, by preventing unauthorised entities from reading messages,
while cryptographic checksums or Message Authentication Codes (MAC) provide both data
integrity and authenticity [52]. Unfortunately, no simple cryptographic solution guarantees
availability, e.g. prevents Denial of Services (DoS) attacks.
In this section, we first provide a basic classification of network security attacks and then
discuss some of the key security protocols, standards and technologies that are used to
secure computer networks.
2.2.1 Types of Network Security Attacks
Network security attacks are classified based on the behaviour of the attacker, as shown in
Figure 2.4. The two main categories are Passive attacks and Active attacks [53, 54].
14
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• Passive attacks are network exploits, in which an attacker passively observes network
traffic and captures data that is being transmitted over a network without involving any
modification or deletion of the data. Eavesdropping is a type of passive attack, where
the attacker aims to read the content of the messages to reveal sensitive information.
This can relatively easily be prevented via encryption. An attacker can still gain some
information by observing the flow of encrypted information. The traffic pattern can
reveal critical information, e.g. who is talking to whom, when, how often, etc. This kind
of passive attack is called traffic analysis. The detection of passive attacks is generally
difficult, due to the nature of the attack. [55].
• In active attacks, an attacker attempts to either modify or delete data. There are four
main types of active attacks:
1. In masquerade attacks, an attacker uses a false identity to gain unauthorised
access to services or information. This attack can be prevented by cryptographic
means, e.g. message authentication codes or digital signatures.
2. In modification attacks, an attacker modifies an intercepted message, e.g. the
packet header or the payload. This requires the attacker to be in the data path
between the sender and receiver, i.e. as aMan-in-the-Middle. This attack can also
be prevented by the same cryptographic means as used to prevent masquerade
attacks, i.e. message authentication codes or digital signatures.
3. In replay attacks, an attacker passively captures and intercepts a stream of mes-
sages transmitted between two legitimate users and fraudulently replays the mes-
sage back to one of the users. This attack is slightly more challenging to detect,
and basic methods based on message authentication codes are vulnerable to
reply attacks. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
4. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to remove or reduce the availability of services
to legitimate users. This is often done by simply overwhelming a server or a
network with illegitimate service requests or packets. As mentioned before, there
is no simple cryptographic method to prevent general DoS attacks.
In contrast to the passive attacks, active attacks can generally be more easily detected,
due to the active intervention of the attacker.
A more detailed overview of network security attacks is provided in [52, 55, 56]
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2.2.2 Network Security Protocols and Technologies
There are a number of ways in which networks can be protected from different types of
attacks. As mentioned above, cryptography is a useful tool and can be implemented in
protocols at different layers of the network protocol stack [57]. Two of the most relevant
security protocols in this context are Transport Layer Security (TLS) / Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec).
TLS (or SSL) [58] is a cryptographic protocol at the transport layer that establishes a secure
end-to-end connection across the network. TLS is the most widely used security protocol in
computer networks, and it provides data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity via a range
of cryptographic algorithms.
IPsec [59] is a suite of security protocols, which provide cryptographic security at the network
layer. IPsec supports key negotiation, authentication, encryption and data integrity similar to
TLS.
In addition to cryptographic tools, there are a number of other technologies used to provide
network security. Some of the key examples include Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS).
A firewall is a device (software or hardware based) that monitors and filters the flow of pack-
ets based on some pre-defined security rules. Firewalls can operate at different layers of the
protocol stack, typically layers 3 and 4, and can be state-less or state-full. Firewalls can also
be host-based or network-based [60].
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) passively monitors the flow of network traffic with the
aim of identifying any policy violations and detecting abnormal and suspicious network traf-
fic. The detection mechanism can either be signature based, in which packets are compared
against a special signature in the database, or anomaly based, in which packets are com-
pared against an established baseline network behaviour [61, 62, 63]. In contrast to typical
firewalls, IDSs also look at the packet payload, i.e. they do Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is similar to IDS, but in addition to alerting, it can ac-
16
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tively prevent or mitigate network attacks, e.g. via blocking malicious traffic or disconnecting
infected hosts [64].
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Literature Review
The fundamental characteristic of the SDN architecture, i.e. the separation of the control
plane from the data plane, represents a two-sided concept from a security perspective. On
the one side, SDN allows the implementation of network security functions and policies
in a new and more simple approach, which has not been possible in traditional networks
[65, 66, 67]. We refer to this as ’Security via SDN’.
On the other hand, the new architecture of SDN brings a range of new potential attack
vectors, including attacks against the control plane and the data plane [68, 69, 70]. We refer
to this aspect of SDN security, i.e. the security of the SDN platform itself, as ’Security of
SDN’.
While there have been quite a lot of works exploring how SDN can be used to implement
different network security functionality, i.e. ’Security via SDN’, there has been relatively less
attention to the security of the SDN architecture and platform, i.e. ’Security of SDN’, which
is the focus of this thesis.
This chapter first provides a broad overview of key works related to ’Security via SDN’, and
then discusses key works related to the security of the SDN architecture itself, i.e. ’Security
of SDN’. More detailed discussions of works that are specifically relevant to the contributions
presented in this thesis are provided in the corresponding chapters.
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3.1 Security via SDN
SDN technology has emerged initially with the objective to improve network management.
One of the initial papers that laid the foundation of the current form of SDN is [71], where
Secure Architecture for the Network Enterprise (SANE) was proposed to ease the network
management and configuration of security middle-boxes of legacy networks through central-
ising the logical network functionality of access control decisions and policies.
SANE primarily concentrates on the registration and authentication mechanisms of network
elements to establish communication successfully. Therefore, no access to services is pro-
vided unless end-hosts grant an explicit permission, i.e. authenticated and registered at the
controller.
This new network architecture paradigm is considered a radical change to the traditional net-
work architecture and a catalyst for the development of Ethane [72], an extension of SANE.
Ethane is basically a security management architecture combining special Ethernet switches
that are extended to track flows in-progress. In Ethane, the network-wide policy decides the
network path that packets are supposed to follow. The proposed solutions resulted in the
widespread adoption of the SDN platform. More recently, SDN has been increasingly used
to enhance network security and to simplify the deployment of new security services [73, 74].
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the key works in this space.
Active security [3] is an SDN-based architecture that implements advanced security mech-
anisms through a centralised and unified programming interface to detect complex attacks
and protect the network infrastructure. Figure 3.1 shows the Active security architecture,
including its two layers: cyber infrastructure and Active security controller. The cyber infras-
tructure layer is a set of network forwarding devices, end-hosts, and security middle-boxes.
The next layer is the Active security controller, which is extended beyond its pivotal role
of controlling the network forwarding devices to communicate with the end-hosts and the
security middle-boxes. The controller, which constitutes the most significant part of the Ac-
tive security architecture, continuously and passively monitors network traffic and collects
information about the current state of the infrastructure. It additionally gathers forensic ev-
idence on-demand at runtime for attribution, while countering the attack through sophisti-
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Figure 3.1: Active Security Architecture [3]
cated mechanisms such as moving malicious and dangerous code to a walled-off system.
The authors create a preliminary prototype that goes beyond the SDN controller to automat-
ically interact and exchange the attack information with dedicated network security devices
such as the Snort Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [63] to detect anomalies and collect
forensic evidence.
When anomalies are detected in network traffic flowing across the infrastructure, the Snort
IDS reports the activity to the Active security controller, which is capable of analysing any
malicious traffic and isolates it from normal traffic to a quarantined machine. Based on the
results of collected data and forensic evidence of the attack statistics, the Active security
controller immediately takes a proper action and dynamically adjusts the configuration of the
infrastructure at runtime.
OrchSec [4] is an orchestrator-based architecture that mainly aims to improve network secu-
rity and increase the system performance, flexibility, reliability and reliance through abstract-
ing the control and network monitoring functions from the control plane and placing them at
an additional layer, i.e. the Orchestrator. The OrchSec architecture is composed of three
layers: infrastructure layer, control layer and orchestration layer, as shown in Figure 3.2. The
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Figure 3.2: OrchSec Architecture [4]
infrastructure layer is basically a collection of SDN forwarding elements, e.g. switches and
routers, that are responsible for forwarding network packets, not including any security de-
vices. The control layer includes multiple SDN controllers running over a virtualisation layer
and a network monitor that utilises sFlow [75] for network traffic sampling. The main function
of the controllers is to coordinate between the Orchestrator and the control plane through a
special application installed in all SDN controllers, i.e. the Orchestrator agent, and initiate
control traffic messages, e.g. flow rules. At the top is the orchestration layer (Orchestrator),
the component of the architecture where network security applications are implemented and
deployed.
LiveSec [5] is another SDN-based architecture that fundamentally aims to provide scalable
and flexible network security management in large-scale production networks through in-
teractive policy-enforcement, real-time traffic monitoring and distributed load-balancing. In
contrast to previous architectures, LiveSec basically appends a new layer to the traditional
network architecture, and thus the LiveSec architecture consists of three layers: legacy-
switching layer, access switching layer and control layer, as shown in Figure 3.3. The
access-switching layer is used to interconnect the control layer and the legacy-switching
layer through a set of OpenFlow-enabled switches. It provides legitimate interfaces for the
control plane, i.e. LiveSec controller to access the legacy-switching layer and the ability to
attach various security elements. The legacy-switching layer is a set of Ethernet switches
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Figure 3.3: LivSec Architecture [5]
that perform layer-2 forwarding. The integral part of the LiveSec architecture is the control
plane, i.e. the LiveSec Controller, which is responsible for identifying and locating the source
of real-time security events.
3.2 Security of SDN
As mentioned before, the different architecture of SDN with its logically centralised control
plane creates potentially new vulnerabilities and attack vectors that do not exist in traditional
networks, or not to the same extent.
In [6], seven main threat vectors are identified in the SDN design that potentially stand in the
way of achieving a secure network environment and keeping all network devices operating
properly. Figure 3.4 shows an overview of these threats, which are indicated respectively
as (1) forged or faked traffic flows, (2) attacks on vulnerabilities in switches, (3) attacks on
control plane communications, (4) attacks on vulnerabilities in controllers, (5) lack of trusted
mechanisms between controller and management applications, (6) attacks on vulnerabilities
in administrative stations, and (7) lack of trusted resources for forensics and remediation.
Inspired by this, we group our discussion of key works on the security of the SDN architecture
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Figure 3.4: Security Threat Vectors Map in SDN [6]
into four categories: security of the control plane, security of the data plane, security of the
application layer, and security of the southbound interface.
3.2.1 Security of the Control Plane
Aggregating the whole network function to a centralised entity (the SDN controller) appears
to present a double-edged sword to the SDN architecture. It evidently improves network
management and operation through the global view of the network [46, 76]. However, the
control plane, i.e. the SDN controller, becomes a serious single point of failure risk and a
prime target for attackers to exploit. The centralised nature of the control plane of the SDN
architecture can potentially degrade the reliability and scalability of SDN, particularly in data
centres [77].
To address this problem, Onix [78] was proposed as a logically centralised SDN controller,
that is a physically distributed system. HyperFlow [79] extended the idea further by maintain-
ing network control centralisation with distributed decision making, thereby minimising the
look-up overhead and the response time of data plane requests imposed by sending them
to the control plane. DISCO [80] is another distributed control plane, where each DISCO
controller manages and controls its network domain and coordinates with other DISCO con-
trollers to provide network services. A comprehensive analysis of various reactive and proac-
tive SDN controllers, with performance evaluation and scalability measurement, is presented
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in [81].
Despite the physical distribution of the SDN controller, its logical centralisation still presents
an interesting target for attackers, since bringing down the controller makes the entire net-
work ’headless’ and consequently disrupts the entire network. Therefore, the security of the
SDN control plane is absolutely critical for the security of SDN overall [82]. In the following,
we summarise some of the key works that have been done in this area, with a focus on DoS
attacks.
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have recently be-
come a primary concern in SDN, due to the centralised nature of the control plane and the
lack of network intelligence at the data plane [68, 83]. Implementing robust DoS and DDoS
attack detection can be quite difficult, due to the similarity between normal and abnormal
traffic, i.e. malicious packets sent by compromised hosts, in which OpenFlow switches are
unable to expose during the packet forwarding process. For this reason, recent DoS and
DDoS attack detection solutions exploit traffic flow statistics to produce efficient and stable
DoS and DDoS protection system. Braga et al. [84] proposed a lightweight DDoS attack
detection method that is configured on traffic flow features to extract information with low
overhead. It basically monitors OpenFlow switches and retrieves active flow statistics at
regular intervals to increase the rate of detection and lower the rate of false alarms. Based
on flow statistics and flow manipulation functions, network traffic is then classified as legiti-
mate or malicious by using Self Organising Maps (SOM), an unsupervised machine learning
algorithm [85].
Another DDoS detection method is proposed in [86], where the Locator/ID separation proto-
col (LISP) [87] is used to analyse the frequency of network traffic and identify the malicious
source of the DDoS attack. Suh et al. [88] presented a content-oriented networking archi-
tecture (CONA) that is capable of creating flows for the host sending a request to the server
and the type of content requested. It then computes the difference between the request rate
and a pre-defined value, and a DDoS attack is detected when the request rate exceeds the
specified threshold.
The paper [89] discussed another approach to launch a DDoS attack against the control
plane of SDN, in which an attacker continually generates various network packets with ran-
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dom headers from multiple nodes to make the controller unable to handle normal network
traffic. To increase the resilience of SDN, the authors proposed the use of second SDN
controller (CPRecovery component) acting as a standby backup that replicates and synchro-
nises with the primary controller to maintain a consistent and up to date global network view.
In the event of a primary controller failure, the second controller is activated and becomes
the primary Network Operating System (NOS).
In [90], the authors extended the SDN architecture to improve network security by distributing
the security functions between the control plane and the data plane. In this architecture, a
local security detection agent, Local Frequent Sets Analyser (LFSA), is installed on each
SDN switch to primarily analyse network traffic patterns and identify vulnerabilities using
data mining. Another security detection agent, Global Frequent Sets Analyser (GFSA), is
installed globally on the SDN controller to continuously monitor the LFSA logs, which hold
information about detected traffic anomalies and triggers appropriate action as a response
to any detected network threat. A key limitation of this approach is that it does not work on
standard OpenFlow switches, and it requires a significant extension of the data plane, which
goes against the ’philosophy’ of SDN, separating control and data plane functionality.
Dotcenko et al. [91] presented a fuzzy logic-based information security management system
that performs intrusion detection and prevention and simultaneously evaluates the security
level of the network, aiming to provide a more secure network environment. The proposed
system at the beginning collects and aggregates statistical network data through real-time
capturing. It then relies on the combination of popular network anomaly detection algorithms
[92, 93], to distinguish between normal and abnormal traffic. Upon detecting an attack,
the system dynamically makes a decision based on fuzzy logic, regarding which counter-
measures, e.g. rate limiting should be applied. The authors claim that this requires less
computational overhead than other approaches.
Klaedtke et al. [94] discussed the fundamental security concepts of SDN controllers and
found that previous access control schemes are insufficient to provide SDN controllers with
a secure environment. This resulted in the proposal of a new network-level access control
scheme based on the OpenFlow protocol. The proposed policy enforcement is placed at
the control plane, which allows the SDN controller to access the flow tables and entries of
OpenFlow switches. It mainly aims to protect network flows and resolve conflicts derived
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from network component reconfiguration. The recommendation of the paper was that net-
work components (SDN applications), which are shared between users, should be logically
separated and users’ security requirements should be expressed and enforced.
3.2.2 Security of the Data Plane
In an OpenFlow-based SDN, switches simply forward packets based on match-action rules
installed in flow tables. Hardware SDN switches typically use Ternary Content Addressable
Memory (TCAM) to maximise forwarding speed. This memory is expensive and therefore
limited in size. This represents a target for DoS attacks, in which attackers try to exhaust the
TCAM memory resources. Also, OpenFlow switches generally need to buffer data packets
that do not match any pre-defined flow rules and wait until the controller finishes processing
the packets and issuing the corresponding flow rules. This could ultimately result in exhaust-
ing the switches’ resources, especially in large-scale networks [70]. In [95], the authors
analyse potential security vulnerabilities across the SDN platform, emphasising the impact
of the default forwarding process on the data plane. An attacker can readily perform a De-
nial of Service (DoS) attack against the data plane, via setting up a large number of new
unknown flows, which result in the installation of a large number of new flow rules by the
controller, thereby exhausting the memory of the switch.
DevoFlow [96] introduced an extension of the current OpenFlow protocol to minimise the
frequent interaction between OpenFlow switches and the SDN controller, as well as the
number of required TCAM entries through the use of wild-carded OpenFlow clone rules. In
the proposed implementation, DevoFlow-based OpenFlow switches replicate the active and
pre-installed flow rules for microflow rules that match the header fields of packets and then
use the microflow rules for updating and configuring global flow rules. Subsequently, the
SDN controller of the DevoFlow architecture is only responsible for the brunt of defining and
inserting flow rules and policies for the Quality of Service (QoS), which further devolves cen-
tralisation to avoid network overhead and increase scalability. Additionally, DevoFlow-based
OpenFlow switches include new mechanisms that allow the switches to perform routing de-
cisions locally, thereby avoiding controller involvement.
Similar to DevoFlow, DIFANE [97] extends the OpenFlow protocol and offloads some of
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the control plane functionality to the data plane through authorising a subset of switches
with sufficiently large memory and processing capabilities for handling a portion of network
traffic. When network traffic does not match any cached flow rules, the receiving switch
forwards the packet to one of these authorised switches, which handle the packet locally in
the data plane instead of contacting the controller. Like DevoFlow, this eventually results
in the reduction of the number of controller-switch interactions and the increase of network
scalability. The primary differences between DevoFlow and DIFANE are that the controller in
the DIFANE implementation is not involved in the process of installing new flow rules and the
network state is distributed among authority switches. As a result, DIFANE-based OpenFlow
switches are enabled to detect and learn topology changes, without relying on the controller
updates. Both of these approaches rely on putting intelligence in the switches, which violate
the philosophy of clear control and data plane separation of SDN.
AVANT-GUARD [98] is a proxy-based solution with an idea similar to DevoFlow and DIFANE,
in which the OpenFlow protocol is being extended. The main purpose of AVANT-GUARD is
to enhance OpenFlow networks’ scalability and resilience under control plane saturation
attacks such as TCP-SYN flooding. It adds intelligence to the data plane that enables se-
curity applications to respond to network threats dynamically. In AVANT-GUARD, OpenFlow
switches are essentially capable of performing forensic analysis on network traffic and in-
specting TCP sessions prior to notifying the controller. Thus, only flow requests that include
a complete TCP handshake are forwarded to the controller.
As mentioned above, these methods require significant changes to SDN and OpenFlow,
and propose moving away from the idea of separating control and data plane, which is an
essential concept in SDN.
3.2.3 Security of the Application Layer
The application layer, i.e. the application plane in SDN environment is basically a set of
software applications. They are programmed and designed to perform network policy de-
cisions and provide various network services such as Quality of Service (QoS), Traffic En-
gineering (TE), Intrusion Detection System (IDS), network security monitoring, firewalling,
and load-balancing [99]. SDN applications directly interact with the control plane through
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the Northbound interface and are enabled to manipulate the behaviour of underlying net-
work devices and network functions. In the following, we discuss key SDN applications that
provide network security services.
CloudWatcher [100] is an OpenFlow-based monitoring application for large-scale networks.
It relies on network traffic analysis technique for offering security and filtering incoming pack-
ets. Based on pre-installed security policies and controlling network flows, CloudWatcher
re-routes network packets to dedicated network security devices for inspection.
FLOWGUARD [101] is an OpenFlow-based firewall application for detecting global policy
violations in real-time and automatically resolving any discovered conflicts between all fire-
wall policies. It actively monitors the flow status in the data plane and records the source
and destination of each flow to enforce one consistent global behaviour across the network.
When a contradiction occurs with the firewall policies, FLOWGUARD does not simply block
and reject the update. Instead, it analyses the context of conflicts and acts accordingly.
Even though the OpenFlow protocol dramatically simplifies the design and the integration
of complex network security applications and reduces the complexity of security policy man-
agement, the current security policy enforcement in SDN is somewhat inefficient and limited.
In particular, malicious OpenFlow applications can contradict and override flow rules created
by other OpenFlow applications, which can result in allowing malicious traffic to pass through
the firewall. In the following, we discuss recent research focused on addressing this problem,
exclusively on security threats raised from malicious applications and address the proposed
security policy enforcement.
FortNOX [102] was introduced as a role-based authorisation and security constraint kernel
directly integrated into the SDN control plane, offering a security mediation and policy en-
forcement. The essential aim of the new mechanisms incorporated into FortNOX is to detect
potential flow rule contradictions within the data plane in real-time, through regularly check-
ing and analysing the flow table after every update. When a contradiction occurs within
a flow rule, FortNOX verifies this rule with flow rules in the security constraints table and
applies the rule with the highest priority.
FRESCO [103] is an OpenFlow-based security application development platform specifically
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designed to efficiently facilitate and enhance the implementation of OpenFlow-based secu-
rity applications through defining high-level security policies and creating innovative security
functions for threat detection and mitigation. FRESCO has access to all network events and
flow statistics, and attack detection is based on a comparison of current network state with
a database of historical network state information. When a threat is detected, the system
reacts with actions such as mirror, redirect or quarantine. In case the action is mirror, the
receiving switch explicitly creates a copy of the packet and forwards it to the packet analysis
system for conducting additional analysis. If the action is redirect, the packet is forwarded
directly to the destination host. However, if the action is quarantine, the packet can only tra-
verse to certain hosts that are equipped with special tools to keep the infected host isolated
from the network. This results in minimising the severity of the threats and simplifies the
management of network security functions in SDN.
3.2.4 Security of the Southbound Interface
The OpenFlow control channel, i.e. the Southbound Interface, is the interface that links
OpenFlow switches to an SDN controller to exchange control messages. Typically, the con-
nection between the SDN controller and OpenFlow switches is encrypted using Transport
Layer Security (TLS). The essential benefit of the TLS protocol is preventing attackers from
being able to take over the control of network switches without having the required authority.
As described in the OpenFlow specification [2], this security feature is optional and there is
no official standard defined for the TLS protocol in the OpenFlow implementation. Unfortu-
nately, some vendors of switches and controllers neglect to enforce the use of this protocol.
The lack of adopting of secure cryptographic protocols to the southbound interface makes
SDN susceptible to the following types of attacks [83, 104]:
• Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where the attacker actively intercepts the control
messages such as flow rules and applies desired changes before reaching the data
plane.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, where the attacker mainly aims to break the connec-
tion between the control plane and the data plane and disrupt the installation of flow
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rules.
• Eavesdropping attacks, where the attacker sniffs valuable information such as the net-
work topology.
• TCP-level attacks, where the attacker exploits vulnerabilities of TLS and floods the
OpenFlow channel with attack packets.
Overall, these vulnerabilities leave avenues for an attacker to proactively and reactively ma-
nipulate the configuration of the switches, which ultimately results in modifying or disrupting
the network behaviour. It is therefore absolutely critical that the control channel is secured
via cryptographic protocols, which provide secure authentication, encryption and integrity
protection of control messages.
Table 3.1 summarises some of the key proposals and works that discuss potential security
threats of SDN technology, at the control plane, data plane, application layer, indicating the
key contribution as well as the proposed attack mitigation methods.
None of the works discussed in this chapter have paid close attention to the potential security
vulnerabilities of the fundamental components of SDN, such as Topology Discovery, ARP
handling and network virtualisation, which represent the key focus and contribution of this
thesis. More closely related works to these specific aspects are discussed in the context of
the corresponding chapters, where the contributions and technical details of this thesis are
presented.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Proposed Security Measures for SDN Layers (Planes)
SDN layer (Plane) Security Projects Main Contribution Mitigation Technique
Control Plane
Hybrid controller
[81]
Evaluating
OpenFlow controller
performance
Add mechanisms to
understand the
traffic behaviour
and set path
on-demand
DDoS Attacks
Detection [105]
Intrusion detection
and prevention
system
Use a window size
and threshold
Dynamic Controller
[106]
Traffic management
for multiple
controllers
Use integer linear
programming
ROSEMARY[107] Secure and high
performance SDN
controller
Use resource
utilisation
monitoring
Data Plane
FlowChecker [108] Configuration
Analyser of
OpenFlow switches
Use binary decision
diagram
Monitoring Model
[109]
Monitoring function
on OpenFlow
switches
Place a general
message generator
and processing
function
Packet-In Filtering
[110]
Filtering
mechanism on
OpenFlow switches
Extend the
OpenFlow
specification
Resonance [111] Dynamic access
control on
OpenFlow switches
Based on policies
the controller
installs
Application Plane
PermOF [112] Resource isolation
and access control
Minimise SDN
application
privileges
Veriflow [113] Flow rules checker Use prefix tree( an
ordered tree data
structure)
FLOVER [114] Flow rules checker Utilise the
satisfiability modulo
theories
Assertion [115] SDN application
debugger
Use VeriFlow
verification
algorithm
OF-testing [116] Automating the
testing of SDN
applications
Use simple traffic
models
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Security of Topology Discovery
4.1 Introduction
In the SDN architecture, it is essential for higher layer services such as routing to have an
accurate and up to date view of the network topology. One of the key network services of
a Network Operating System (NOS), i.e. SDN control layer, is to provide network topology
information to the application layer.
While there is no official standard for an SDN topology discovery mechanism, there is a de-
facto standard, which is sometimes informally referred to as Open Flow Discovery Protocol
(OFDP) [117, 118]. All major SDN controllers implement it in essentially the same way, most
likely due to the fact that it has been adopted from NOX, the original SDN controller [48].
The problem with OFDP is that it is fundamentally insecure, as is demonstrated in this chap-
ter. We show how an attacker can poison the topology view of the SDN controller and create
spoofed links by crafting special control packets and injecting them into the network via one
or more compromised hosts.
We show the feasibility of the attack, both via network emulation as well as test-bed ex-
periments, for both POX [33] and Ryu [34], two widely used SDN controller platforms. We
further demonstrate and evaluate the impact of the link spoofing attack on higher layer ser-
vices. We use shortest path routing as a case study and show that an attacker can relatively
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Figure 4.1: LLDP Frame Structure
easily cause significant disruption of network connectivity. The impact, i.e. the level of con-
nectivity disruption is quantified in two example scenarios. A final contribution of the chapter
is the discussion and evaluation of countermeasures against the vulnerability.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes in detail the
operation of OFDP, the current state-of-the-art topology discovery mechanism in SDN. Sec-
tion 4.3 describes the vulnerability of OFDP and demonstrates a number of link spoofing
attacks. Section 4.4 investigates the impact of the attack on higher layer services, based
on the example of routing. Section 4.5 discusses countermeasures, Section 4.6 discusses
related works, and Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP)
Topology discovery is an essential service in SDN and underpins many higher layer ser-
vices. In this context, when we refer to topology discovery, we mean link discovery, since
the controller learns about the existence of network nodes (switches) by other means, as
discussed previously.
OpenFlow switches themselves do not support any topology (link) discovery functionality,
and it, therefore, needs to be implemented as a service at the controller. There is currently
no official standard for topology discovery in SDNs based on OpenFlow. However, there
is a de-facto standard, since all the major SDN controller platforms implement topology
discovery in essentially the same way, derived from the topology discovery mechanism in
NOX [48]. This mechanism is sometimes referred to informally as OpenFlow Discovery
Protocol (OFDP) in [118, 119], and for lack of an official term, we use it in this chapter.
OFDP uses the frame format defined in the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [120],
designed for link and neighbour discovery in Ethernet networks. However, except the frame
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Figure 4.2: Basic OFDP Example Scenario
format, OFDP has not much in common with LLDP and operates quite differently.
The format of an LLDP frame, as used in OFDP, is shown in Figure 4.1. The LLDP payload
is encapsulated in an Ethernet frame with the EtherType field set to 0x88CC. The Ethernet
frame contains an LLDP Data Unit (LLDPDU) (shaded in grey in Figure 4.1), which has a
number of type-length-value (TLV) fields. The mandatory TLVs include Chassis ID, a unique
switch identifier, Port ID, a port identifier, and a Time to live field. These TLVs can be followed
by a number of optional TLVs and an End of LLDPDU TLV.
An OpenFlow switch, due to its lack of control intelligence and autonomous operation, cannot
initiate the sending and processing of link discovery packets, as is the case for traditional
Ethernet switches, and as specified in the LLDP standard [120]. In SDN, link discovery is
initiated by the controller. How this works in OFDP is illustrated via a basic example scenario
shown in Figure 4.2. Initially, the SDN controller creates a dedicated LLDP packet for each
port on each switch, in our example, a packet for port P1, a packet for port P2 and one
for port P3 on switch S1. All these LLDP packets have their Chassis ID, and Port ID TLVs
initialised accordingly.
The controller then uses a separate OpenFlow Packet-Out message to send each of the
LLDP packets to switch S1. Every OpenFlow Packet-Out message also includes an action,
which instructs the switch to forward the packet via the corresponding port. For example,
the LLDP packet with Port ID = P1 will be sent out on port P1, the packet with Port ID = P2
on port P2, etc.
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Switches are pre-configured with a rule which states that any received LLDP packets are to
be sent to the controller via an OpenFlow Packet-In message. As an example, we consider
the LLDP packet which is sent out on port P1 on switch S1 and is received by switch S2
via port P3 in Figure 4.2. According to the pre-installed rule, switch S2 sends the LLDP
packet to the controller, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-In message. This OpenFlow
Packet-In message also contains additional metadata, such as the ingress port where the
packet was received, as well as the Chassis ID of the switch sending the OpenFlow Packet-
In message. This information, combined with information about the origin switch and port,
contained in the payload of the LLDP packet (Chassis ID and Port ID TLVs) can be used by
the controller to infer the existence of a link between (S1, P1) and (S2, P3).
This process is repeated for every switch in the network, i.e. the controller sends a separate
OpenFlow Packet-Out message with a dedicated LLDP packet for each port of each switch,
allowing it to discover all available links in the network.1 The entire process is repeated
continuously, with a typical discovery interval of 5 seconds [33].
Most current SDN controller platforms such as NOX [48], POX [33], Ryu [34], ONOS [35],
OpenDaylight [37], Floodlight [36], and Beacon [121] implement the OFDP discovery mech-
anism as described above. A study of the source code of the different implementations
reveals only very minor variations, for example in regards to the timing of the sending of
the Packet-Out messages, or the encoding of Chassis ID and Port ID information in LLDP
packets.
4.3 OFDP Link Spoofing - Basic Vulnerability
The basic security problem with the current SDN topology discovery mechanism (OFDP) is
that there is no authentication of LLDP control messages. Any LLDP packet received by the
controller is accepted, and link information contained in it is used to update the controller’s
topology view.
More specifically, OFDP lacks the following two checks:
1The authors in [117] have demonstrated how the efficiency of this approach can be significantly improved.
35
Chapter 4: Security of Topology Discovery
SDN
Controller
S1 S2 S3
P2 P2 P2P3
P1P1 P1
h2 h3h1
Figure 4.3: Basic Attack Scenario (Mininet)
• OFDP does not check or enforce that only LLDP packets received via switch ports
connected to another switch are accepted for processing. Instead, LLDP packets from
host ports are also accepted and forwarded to the controller.
• There is no authentication or integrity check of LLDP control messages. The controller
has no way of verifying the origin of the packets.
As a result, it is relatively easy for an attacker to inject fabricated (spoofed) LLDP control
messages into the network and thereby corrupting the topology information of the controller.
We illustrate this via a simple example, shown in Figure 4.3. In this scenario, we assume
that host h1 has been compromised by an attacker, who aims to create a fake link between
switches S1 and S3.
The attack can be broken down into the following steps:
1. Host h1 injects an LLDP packet via port P1 on switch S1, where h1 is attached. The
injected packet follows the structure shown in Figure 4.1, but with the Chassis ID TLV
set to S3, and the Port ID set to P1.
2. Switch S1 receives the LLDP packet from h1, and following its installed rule, it forwards
the packet to the controller, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-In message. Switch
S1 adds information to the OpenFlow Packet-In message, i.e. its own Chassis ID and
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Table 4.1: Software Tools used for Implementation and Experiments in Chapter 4
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.1.0
OFELIA [32] Hardware SDN Test-bed =======
Open vSwitch [31] Virtual SDN Switch 2.0.2
POX [33] SDN Controller Platform dart branch
Scapy Library [38] Packet Manipulation Tool 2.2.0
the Port ID of the ingress port via which the LLDP packet was received at switch S1.
In our scenario, this information is (S1, P1).
3. The controller receives the LLDP packet plus the additional information added by
switch S1. It identifies the source of the LLDP packet, and therefore the origin of
the link from the TLVs in the payload is (S3, P1). The information about the other end
of the link is taken from the metadata of the Packet-In message, and is identified as
(S1, P1). From this information, the controller concludes (wrongly) that there exists a
link between (S3, P1) and (S1, P1).
4.3.1 Experimental Validation - Mininet
To validate the feasibility of the link spoofing attack experimentally, we used Mininet [30] and
Open vSwitch (OVS) [31]. For our initial experiment, we used the POX controller platform
and its implementation of OFDP, i.e. the openflow.discovery component. We wrote a packet
generator in Python based on the Scapy library [38] to craft a special LLDP packet for the
attack. Table 8.2 summarises the relevant software tools that we used in the experiments of
this chapter. The Mininet experiments were run on a standard Dell PC (OptiPlex 780 with a
3 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU and 4 GB of RAM), running Ubuntu Linux with kernel version
3.13.0.
Figure 4.4 shows the debug output of the POX controller, in particular the openflow.discovery
component which implements OFDP. No other POX component was running in this exper-
iment. From the output, we see that our three switches have connected to the controller,
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root@mininet-vm:~/pox# ./pox.py openflow.discovery 
POX 0.3.0 (dart) / Copyright 2011-2014 James McCauley, et al. 
INFO:core:POX 0.3.0 (dart) is up. 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-01 2] connected 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-02 1] connected 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-03 3] connected 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 00-00-00-00-00-01.2 -> 00-00-00-00-00-02.2 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 00-00-00-00-00-02.3 -> 00-00-00-00-00-03.2 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 00-00-00-00-00-02.2 -> 00-00-00-00-00-01.2 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 00-00-00-00-00-03.2 -> 00-00-00-00-00-02.3 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 00-00-00-00-00-03.1 -> 00-00-00-00-00-01.1 
Figure 4.4: POX Debug Information (Mininet)
with Chassis ID of 00-00-00-00-00-01 for switch S1, 00-00-00-00-00-02 for switch S2 and
00-00-00-00-00-03 for switch S3. This debug output is generated by the main POX compo-
nent.
The last five lines of the output are from the openflow.discovery component. Each line
indicates the detection of a unidirectional link, caused by the reception of a corresponding
LLDP packet at the controller. For example, the first of these lines indicates that a link from
(S1, P2) to (S2, P2), i.e. from port P2 on switch S1 to Port P2 on switch S2, has been
detected. The next line indicates a link from (S2, P3) to (S3, P2). The following two lines
indicate the detection of the same links in the reverse direction. This is consistent with our
topology, as shown in Figure 4.3.
The interesting part in Figure 4.4 is the last line (in bold), which appears after we run the
attack by injecting the fabricated LLDP packet from host h1 to switch S1. The line indicates
that a non-existent link from (S3, P1) to (S1, P1) is detected by the controller, and hence
the link spoofing attack has been successful. When we look at the topology view of the
controller, which is stored as a list of links, we see that the link has indeed been added.
It is important to note that the attacker can spoof the origin of the link (switch and port) ar-
bitrarily, simply by setting the relevant LLDP TLVs accordingly. However, the link destination
information is added as metadata to the OpenFlow Packet-Inmessage by the ingress switch,
and hence cannot be changed by the attacker. For our example, this means that the spoofed
links, which host h1 can create are, limited to the set of unidirectional links terminating at port
P1 on switch S1.
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Figure 4.5: Basic Attack Scenario (OFELIA)
If an attacker wants to create a spoofed bidirectional link, for example, from switch S1 to
switch S3 in our scenario, the attacker needs to control both hosts h1 and h3. We discuss
this in more detail in Section 4.4.
We also performed the above attack with the Ryu SDN controller, with identical results.
However, we had to slightly modify our LLDP packet generation script, since Ryu uses a
different encoding format for the Chassis ID and Port ID values in the LLDP packet.
4.3.2 Experimental Validation - OFELIA
In addition to our emulation based experiments using Mininet, we also conducted the same
experiment on the OFELIA SDN test-bed [32]. Our goal was to replicate the topology shown
in Figure 4.3. We managed to do this, with the exception of a small detail. OFELIA provides
only three virtual machines to experimenters, of which one is used for the controller, leaving
only two for the use as hosts. Figure 4.5 shows our OFELIA topology, with the corresponding
Chassis IDs and Port IDs. The main difference to Figure 4.3 is that the host attached to
switch S2 is missing, which is not a problem, since it does not play an active role in this
attack scenario.
After configuring the topology, we conducted the same experiment as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.1, with the same POX controller code and configuration. We also used the same
packet injection code, with a small modification to account for the different interface name
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root@POX:/ofelia/users/farzanehpakzad/pox# ./pox.py openflow.discovery openflow.debug POX 
0.2.0 (carp) / Copyright 2011-2013 James McCauley, et al.  
INFO:core:POX 0.2.0 (carp) is up.  
INFO:openflow.of_01:[02-08-00-00-00-06|520 1] connected  
INFO:openflow.of_01:[02-08-00-00-00-01|520 3] connected  
INFO:openflow.of_01:[02-08-00-00-00-03|520 2] connected  
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 02-08-00-00-00-06|520.3 -> 02-08-00-00-00-01|520.3 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 02-08-00-00-00-01|520.3 -> 02-08-00-00-00-06|520.3 
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 02-08-00-00-00-01|520.26 -> 02-08-00-00-00-03|520.26  
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 02-08-00-00-00-03|520.26 -> 02-08-00-00-00-01|520.26  
INFO:openflow.discovery:link detected: 02-08-00-00-00-03|520.11 -> 02-08-00-00-00-06|520.1 
Figure 4.6: POX Debug Information (OFELIA)
on host h1.
Figure 4.6 shows the debug output from POX. We see that bidirectional links are created
between port P3 on switch S1 (02-08-00-00-00-06), and port P3 on switch S2 (02-08-00-
00-00-01), as well as between port P26 on switch S2 (02-08-00-00-00-01), and port P26 on
switch S3 (02-08-00-00-00-03). The last line again indicates that the attack was successful,
and there was a link created between switch S1 and switch S3. We have also verified the
creation of the fake link in the controller’s topology view. As with Mininet, we have replicated
the attack for Ryu, with the same results.
Our experiments have demonstrated the basic vulnerability of OFDP, the predominant SDN
topology discovery mechanism. As mentioned earlier, topology discovery is an essential
network service provided in SDN, upon which a lot of other services and applications rely.
In the following section, we discuss the potential impact of the vulnerability on such higher
layer services, using the example of shortest path routing.
4.4 Impact on Routing
Routing is a key network application that relies on the controller having an up to date and
accurate topology view. Shortest path routing in SDN is relatively trivial, compared to tra-
ditional networks. The challenge of dealing with a physically distributed system is done by
the topology discovery component, implemented by the controller platform. Given a network
topology as a graph, shortest path routing is essentially just computing the shortest path be-
tween the source and destination nodes, e.g. via Dijkstra’s algorithm [122]. In the following,
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Figure 4.7: Linear Topology for Routing Experiment
we evaluate and quantify the impact of the attack on routing via two topology examples.
4.4.1 Linear Topology
For our next experiment, we consider a simple linear topology with five switches and a single
host attached to each switch, as shown in Figure 4.7. As before, we assume that host h1
is the attacker, which in this case injects a fabricated LLDP packet with the aim of creating
a false (unidirectional) link between (S5, P1) and (S1, P1). This spoofed link is shown as a
dashed line in Figure 4.7. As described in the previous section, the attacker simply needs to
set the Chassis ID to S5, and the Port ID to P1 in the fabricated LLDP packet for this attack.
We created this topology in Mininet and used the layer 2 shortest path routing component
in POX (l2_multi.py) for our experiment. This POX component computes shortest paths
between node pairs using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [123].
Prior to launching the attack, we performed a ping test among all host pairs to verify the
connectivity. This was achieved via the pingall command in Mininet. We saw that we had
100% connectivity, and each host could reach every other host. After launching the attack
from host h1, which injected the fabricated LLDP packet, we verified that the topology dis-
covery service had indeed added a link from (S5, P1) to (S1, P1) to the controller’s topology
database.
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Table 4.2: Connectivity After Attack
HHHHHHHHHHH
ping
src
ping
dst h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
h1 1 1 0 0
h2 1 1 1 0
h3 1 1 1 1
h4 0 1 1 1
h5 0 0 1 1
However, after running pingall again, we still saw a connectivity of 100%. Inspection of
the source code of l2_multi.py reveals that only bidirectional links are considered for path
computation, which is why the attack was unsuccessful.
In this case, to be able to disrupt network connectivity, the attacker needs to spoof a bidi-
rectional link. This is impossible to achieve with control over only a single host, due to the
fact that only one end point of the spoofed link, i.e. the source, can be chosen by the at-
tacker. The other end of the link is determined by the ingress port and switch where the
LLDP packet is injected by the attacker. Another way of expressing this is that an attacker
controlling a single host can create unidirectional links starting at any source, but they all
have to terminate at the switch and port, where the attacking host is connected to.
To establish a bidirectional link, the attacker needs to control at least two hosts. In this new
attack scenario, we assume the attacker has compromised and controlled hosts h1 and h5.
As in the previous case, h1 injects an LLDP packet with the Chassis ID and Port ID set to
S5 and P1, creating the unidirectional link from (S5, P1) to (S1, P1). In addition, h5 injects
an LLDP packet with the source set to (S1, P1), creating the link in the reverse direction.
We ran the pairwise ping test again, and the result is shown in Table 4.2. The leftmost
column indicates the source, and the topmost row indicates the destination of the ICMP
echo request message sent by ping. A ’1’ in the table indicates that there is connectivity
between the two hosts in the corresponding row and column, and a ’0’ indicates a lack of
connectivity. We can see that connectivity between a pair of hosts is disrupted when the
spoofed link (S1-S5) is part of the shortest path between the two hosts, as expected.
42
Chapter 4: Security of Topology Discovery
This attack on the topology discovery mechanism significantly disrupts connectivity for rout-
ing. In this scenario, almost 30% of all links are disrupted by the creation of a single spoofed
bidirectional link. We have also replicated the experiment in OFELIA, with an identical out-
come.
While often shortest path routing assumes bidirectional links, such as the POX component
we have considered here, this is a design decision rather an absolute requirement. Other
implementations, such as [124], also consider unidirectional links in their computation of
shortest paths. In this case, the attacker only needs to control a single host and can disrupt
connectivity via creating unidirectional spoofed links.
4.4.2 Tree Topology
We also considered a tree topology, as shown in Figure 4.8. The topology consists of 15
switches, organised in a binary tree of depth 4 and fan-out 2, with a host attached to each
leaf switch. In this experiment, we tried to quantify the connectivity disruption impact of the
link spoofing attack.
We created bidirectional fake links between all host pairs, one at the time. For each of those
scenarios, i.e. for each case with a different fake link in the network, we ran a complete ping
test (pingall) between all host pairs, resulting in a total of 56 pings. We then considered how
many of those pings failed, due to the creation of each individual fabricated link.
The results are shown in Table 4.3, which shows the percentage (rounded to the nearest
integer) of connectivity loss, i.e. failed pings, due to each of the possible fabricated links.
For example, we see that if a single fake link is generated between hosts h1 and h8, 29% of
the connectivity between host pairs is disrupted.
We observe that there are only three distinct values in the table, 4%, 11% and 29%, which
correspond to 3 different scenarios in our example. We get 4% (rounded) in the case where
the fake link is between 2 hosts that are attached to the same switch at level 3 in the topology,
for example hosts h1 and h2, or hosts h3 and h4, etc. In this case, the spoofed link forms
part of the shortest path for only 2 out of the total of 56 ping paths, i.e. from h1 to h2, and h2
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Figure 4.8: Tree Topology for Routing Experiment
Table 4.3: Connectivity Loss Due to Link Spoofing Attack
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
fake
link
src
fake
link
dst h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8
h1 4% 11% 11% 29% 29% 29% 29%
h2 4% 11% 11% 29% 29% 29% 29%
h3 11% 11% 4% 29% 29% 29% 29%
h4 11% 11% 4% 29% 29% 29% 29%
h5 29% 29% 29% 29% 4% 11% 11%
h6 29% 29% 29% 29% 4% 11% 11%
h7 29% 29% 29% 29% 11% 11% 4%
h8 29% 29% 29% 29% 11% 11% 4%
to h1.
For the case where the fake link is between two hosts connected via a common switch at
level 2 of the topology, e.g. hosts h1 and h3 via switch S2, we observe that the fake link is
part of the shortest path of 6 out of the total of 56 source-destination pairs, resulting in a loss
of 11% connections.
Finally, if a fake link is created between hosts that are located in different main branches of
the tree, i.e. if they are connected via switch S1 at level 1 of the topology, 29% (16 out of
56) connections are disrupted. This is due to the fact that the spoofed link provides a shorter
path or shortcut for a larger number of source-destination pairs.
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The exact numbers are obviously specific to this particular example. However, it demon-
strates the potential power of the link spoofing attack in terms of connectivity disruption for
routing in SDN. By creating multiple spoofed links, the impact would obviously be com-
pounded. The example also shows that by targeting the location of the spoofed link(s) in the
network topology, an attacker can maximise the impact.
4.4.3 Discussion
We have demonstrated that the vulnerability of OFDP translates into a vulnerability of routing,
which relies heavily on the topology discovery service provided by the controller. An attacker
can relatively easily disrupt network connectivity since the attacker only needs to gain control
over a small number of hosts. This is typically much easier to achieve than gaining control
over network infrastructure devices, i.e. switches or controllers. Since all the open source
controller platforms that we have investigated implement OFDP in essentially the same way,
the vulnerability discussed in this chapter is shared by all of them, and hence the problem is
significant.
We have used the example of routing to demonstrate the potential impact of the link spoofing
attack, but it is clear that other services, which rely on the topology discovery service, are
also vulnerable to the attack. We have done some preliminary investigation into the spanning
tree component in POX and found it to be vulnerable as well. This is critical, given the fact
that many services rely on the spanning tree mechanism, such as the L2_learning switch
component in POX.
4.5 Countermeasures
As mentioned previously, the vulnerability of OFDP is due to the lack of any checks about
the origin of received LLDP packets. We discuss two basic approaches to address this.
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4.5.1 Controller Checks
The link spoofing attack, as presented in this chapter, could be rendered impossible if LLDP
packets were only accepted via switch ports that connected to other switches.
This check could be implemented via installing a simple rule on each switch, or alternatively,
it could be performed at the controller. The problem with this approach is that it assumes
knowledge about each port on each switch, and to what type of node it is connected to.
In a network with a dynamic topology, there is no simple and secure way to keep track of
that, to the best of our knowledge. For example, services that keep track of hosts, such as
the host_tracker component in POX, are themselves vulnerable to attacks [125], and hence
cannot be assumed to provide reliable information.
4.5.2 LLDP Packet Authentication
The problem of lacking the authenticity of LLDP messages can relatively easily be over-
come by adding a cryptographic Message Authentication Code (MAC) to each LLDP packet
that the controller sends out. Such a MAC provides authentication as well as integrity for
each packet. We have implemented this mechanism in POX using a Hash-based Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) [126]. The MAC is computed as follows:
HMAC(K,m) = h((K⊕ opad)|h(K⊕ |ipad)|m)
K is the secret key, and m is the message over which the HMAC is calculated. In our case, m
consists of the relevant LLDP TLVs, i.e. the Chassis ID and the Port ID. h() is a cryptographic
hash function, ‘|’ denotes concatenation and ‘⊕’ denotes the XOR operation. opad and ipad
are constant padding values [126].
It is important to note that the basic HMAC is vulnerable to replay attacks. In the scenario
shown in Figure 4.3, a replay attack can be used against a topology discovery mechanism
protected with a basic HMAC. The attack requires control over two hosts, e.g. hosts h1 and
h3. As part of the normal OFDP protocol, host h1 will receive LLDP packets with Chassis
ID set to S1 and Port ID set to P1. Here, we assume that the LLDP packet is secured with
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a HMAC, computed over the relevant LLDP TLVs, using the secret key K. Host h1 can then
send this LLDP packet to its colluding partner host h3 via an out-of-band channel. Host h3
then injects the packet to switch S3 via port P1. Since the packet has a valid MAC, the
controller accepts it, and a spoofed link from (S1, P1) to (S3, P1) is successfully created.
The reverse link can be created in the same way. We have implemented this attack and
verified its feasibility.
The traditional approach to prevent replay attacks in the HMAC is via the use of a unique
message identifier (or nonce) over which the HMAC is computed, to ensure that each HMAC
value is unique. This message identifier needs to be sent as cleartext to the receiver as part
of the message, causing additional overhead.
We, therefore, use an alternative approach in our implementation. Instead of using a unique
message identifier, we replace the static secret key K with a dynamic value Ki,j, which is ran-
domly chosen for every single LLDP packet i, in every topology discovery round j. The best
chance for an attacker to compute a valid MAC and launch a successful link spoofing attack
is via guessing the correct value of the random numbers Ki,j. This is virtually impossible if
we use a high-quality random number generator that provides sufficient entropy. Any wrong
guess by an attacker can easily be detected by the controller.
To verify the authenticity of a received LLDP packet and compute its HMAC value, the con-
troller needs to know the corresponding value of Ki,j. This is achieved by the controller
keeping track of which key is used for which packet. The combination of Chassis ID and
Port ID provides the necessary identifier.
We used MD5 as our hash functions. While MD5 has been shown to be vulnerable to a range
of collision attacks, it can still be considered sufficiently secure in the context of HMAC [126],
since HMAC does not rely on the collision resistance property [127]. 2
We have implemented this HMAC based mechanism in the topology discovery component
in POX. To accommodate the MAC, we defined a new, optional TLV in the LLDP packet.
We have conducted extensive tests and have verified that OFDP with the added HMAC
(OFDP_HMAC) is indeed able to detect the injection of any fabricated LLDP packets from
2It would obviously be trivial to replace MD5 with another hash function such as SHA3.
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Figure 4.9: Computational Overhead of HMAC in OFDP
an attacker.
When creating an LLDP packet, the controller chooses a value N, computes HMAC, and
adds the result to the TLV.
Whenever the controller receives an LLDP packet via an OpenFlow Packet-In message, it
computes the MAC over the relevant TLVs in the LLDP packet, using the corresponding
value of Ki,j. If the computed value matches the MAC in the packet, the authenticity of the
packet is validated, and its content is used to update the controller’s topology view. If not,
the packet is discarded, and an alarm can be raised.
We have also evaluated the computational overhead on the controller caused by this mech-
anism. For this, we used a 21 node tree topology in Mininet, with depth 2 and fan-out 4, and
ran both the original OFDP mechanism in POX, as well as OFDP_HMAC. Figure 4.9 shows
the total cumulative controller CPU time used by each version, over an experiment period
of 300 seconds. The experiment was repeated 20 times, and the figure shows the 95%
confidence interval. The absolute values are not that interesting since they are hardware
dependent. However, we see that in relative terms, the overhead of HMAC adds an extra
8% in CPU load to the low computational cost of the topology discovery mechanism. We
believe this is an acceptable cost to pay for the increased level of security.
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4.6 Related Works
There have been a number of works that address various security aspects of SDN. However,
only very few recent papers have addressed the security of the core SDN service of topology
discovery.
The paper [128] discusses a range of attacks against SDN, and proposes SPHINX, a
generic SDN attack alert system, which compares network behaviour with predefined or
learned ‘normal’ behaviour, defined as policies. The paper also mentions the possibility
of attacks against topology discovery via spoofing of LLDP packets, as discussed in this
chapter. The paper does not address the specific technical details of the attack, such as
provided in this chapter, nor does it explore and quantify the impact of the attack on network
connectivity.
In [125], the authors also discuss a range of attacks against SDNs, including ARP spoofing
attacks as well as link spoofing attacks. Due to the wide scope of the paper, it does not
specifically consider, evaluate or quantify the impact of the link spoofing attack on routing
and hence network connectivity, as we have done in this chapter. Furthermore, in contrast
to our work, the experiments in [125] are limited to software switches only. The authors
of [125] also discuss potential countermeasures against the link spoofing attack, and also
suggest a HMAC based packet authentication mechanism. However, their proposed method
uses a static secret key, without a nonce, for the computation of the HMAC, and is therefore
vulnerable to replay attacks, as discussed in the previous section.
4.7 Conclusions
Topology discovery is an essential service in SDN, and a variety of other services and ap-
plications, such as routing, rely on it. In this chapter, we have discussed OFDP, the current
de-facto standard of topology discovery in SDN, implemented by most SDN controller plat-
forms. We have discussed the vulnerability of OFDP to link spoofing attacks, which only
requires an attacker to have control over one or more hosts (physical or virtual) in the net-
work.
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Through experiments in both emulated network scenarios using Mininet, and an SDN test-
bed (OFELIA), we have demonstrated the feasibility of the attack. We have shown that the
controller’s topology view can be successfully poisoned by the attacker, and non-existent
links can be added to the controller’s topology database. We have further evaluated the
impact of this attack on the operation of an SDN, in particular with the example of routing.
Finally, we discussed potential countermeasures and implemented a simple mechanism that
provides authentication using a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). We
have also discussed and verified its ability to prevent the link spoofing attack demonstrated
in this chapter. Finally, we have measured the computational cost of implementing the mea-
sure.
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Security of Address Resolution Protocol
5.1 Introduction
The resolution of network layer addresses to link-layer addresses is an essential function
in packet switched networks. In IPv4 networks, this service is provided by the Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) [21]. When a host wants to send a frame to another node on
the local network, it broadcasts an ARP request, specifying the targeted destination node’s
IP address, as well as the source node’s MAC address. Upon receiving the ARP request,
the node with the specified (target) IP address, will respond with an ARP reply message,
containing its own MAC address. This information is then added to the sending node’s ARP
cache, and the layer 2 frame can be sent.
In IPv6, this address mapping service is implemented via the Neighbour Discovery Pro-
tocol (NDP), in particular via Neighbour Solicitation (NS) and Neighbour Advertisement
(NA) [129, 130], which allows the discovery of the link layer address of a node on the same
local network. Similar to ARP, an IPv6 node can multicast a Neighbour Solicitation message
on the local network, specifying the target IP address. In response, the node with the spec-
ified target IP address sends a Neighbour Advertisement message, containing its link-local
address.
Both ARP and NDP (NS/NA) are vulnerable to spoofing or poisoning attacks, where an at-
tacker can create false entries in a host’s ARP cache in IPv4 or Neighbour Cache in the
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case of IPv6 [131]. The vulnerability is due to the fact that both ARP and NDP are stateless
protocols and neither of the two (in their basic version) support any cryptographic authenti-
cation mechanism. In the context of ARP, an attacker can send an ARP message (request
or reply) in the local network, with a false IP-to-MAC address binding. This information is
accepted by nodes, receiving the message, and their ARP cache is updated accordingly.
As a result, they are poisoned. Similarly, a host can send a fabricated NDP Neighbour So-
licitation or Neighbour Advertisement message, thereby associating an IP address with the
layer 2 address of another host. As a result of a successful attack, packets are sent to a
malicious node instead of the intended destination. This can be used to launch Denial of
Service (DoS) and Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. While some of the technical details
vary, the basic mechanism of ARP and NDP (NS/NA) and their vulnerabilities to spoofing
attacks are very similar.
In this chapter, we explore ARP spoofing detection and mitigation mechanisms in the con-
text of SDN. The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the relevant
background of ARP, ARP spoofing, and traditional countermeasures. Section 5.3 discusses
the basic approaches for ARP handling in SDN. Section 5.4 demonstrates ARP and NDP
spoofing in SDN. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present our two proposed countermeasures and their
evaluation. Section 5.7 discusses related works and Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
Figure 5.1 shows the Ethernet frame structure of ARP packets. As can be seen in the figure,
the ARP payload is encapsulated in an Ethernet frame with an Ether Type field of 0x0806.
The payload includes Sender Hardware Address (SHA) and Target Hardware Address (THA)
fields, which are the MAC addresses of the sender and the intended receiver, i.e. target.
The frame also contains the Sender Protocol Address (SPA) and Target Protocol Addresses
(TPA) fields, which represent the IP addresses of the sender and the target. The Operation
field indicates if the packet is an ARP request, with a value of 1, or an ARP reply, with a
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Figure 5.1: ARP Frame Structure
value of 2.
When a host wants to deliver an IP datagram as an Ethernet frame to another host on the
same subnet, whose MAC address is unknown, it broadcasts an ARP request with the SHA
field set to its own MAC address and the SPA field set to its own IP address. The TPA field is
set to the IP address of the intended destination node, while the THA field is initialised with
a dummy value (00:00:00:00:00:00), representing the unknown target MAC address. Each
node that receives the ARP request will learn about the IP-MAC address mapping of the
sending node (SHA and SPA) and will add the information to its ARP cache. Each recipient
node will check if the TPA value in the request matches its own IP address, and if so, will
respond with an ARP reply message.
The fields of the ARP reply message are initialised by swapping the roles of the sender and
target. The SHA field is set to the MAC address of the node that received the ARP request
and represents the answer to the question posed in the request. The SPA field is set to
the corresponding IP address and is copied from the TPA field in the corresponding ARP
request. Finally, the THA and TPA fields of the ARP reply are initialised as the SHA and SPA
fields of the corresponding ARP request. The ARP reply is then unicast to the MAC address
of the sender of the ARP request (THA in ARP reply = SHA in ARP request). The recipient
of the ARP reply will update its ARP cache and add the newly learned SPA-SHA address
mapping [132] [133]. ARP also supports gratuitous replies, which are unsolicited messages
without a corresponding request.
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We refer to the ARP handling approach discussed above as Regular ARP, in order to con-
trast it with Proxy ARP. Proxy ARP is a mechanism where a node, typically a router, answers
ARP requests intended for another host on behalf of that node. Both Regular ARP and Proxy
ARP are supported and widely used in SDN, and we cover both methods in this chapter.
5.2.2 ARP Spoofing
The basic security problem with ARP (and NDP) is that it is a stateless protocol, i.e. it treats
each request or reply independently from any previous communication. As a consequence,
a host will readily accept information from gratuitous ARP replies, without having sent a
corresponding request. Furthermore, the ARP protocol has no mechanism to authenticate
the sender of an ARP request or reply message or to check the integrity and validity of the
provided information. As a result, it is relatively easy for an attacker to poison a host’s ARP
cache with a false IP-MAC address mapping. All the attacker needs to do is to craft an ARP
message with a false SPA field. A node receiving the message will simply trust the content
and update its ARP cache accordingly.
ARP spoofing attacks can be done via ARP request messages or ARP reply messages. To
launch an ARP request based attack, the attacker sets the SHA and SPA fields to the desired
values and broadcasts the message. As a result, the ARP cache of every node on the same
subnet will be poisoned. An attacker can use either a gratuitous or non-gratuitous ARP
request message for such an attack. The ARP spoofing attacks allow an attacker to redirect
traffic from a target host to any arbitrary node, thereby enabling DoS or MITM attacks [23].
5.2.3 Traditional ARP Spoofing Countermeasures
Arguably, the strongest protection against ARP or NDP spoofing is via cryptographic authen-
tication and integrity mechanisms. S-ARP [134] proposes such a cryptographic protection.
It uses public key cryptography and relies on each node having a public/private key pair.
The ARP packet format is extended and adds a digital signature field, providing message
authenticity and integrity. S-ARP only protects ARP reply messages and therefore remains
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vulnerable to ARP request based spoofing attacks. The other key limitation of this approach
is its reliance on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), in particular a Certificate Authority (CA)
for its operation. This requirement has proven to be impractical for a low-level protocol such
as ARP, as is demonstrated by the lack of adoption of S-ARP and related ideas.
A similar cryptographic solution exists for the protection of the NDP (NS/NA) protocol in IPv6.
The Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND) protocol is a security extension of NDP [135].
This approach shares similar practical challenges with S-ARP, imposed by the problem of
bootstrapping and key management [136].
A number of non-cryptographic ARP spoofing detection and prevention have been proposed
for traditional IP networks [137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143]. A survey of these measures
is provided in [22]. One of the most prominent and widely used ARP spoofing mitigation
approaches is Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) [25]. DAI is implemented in Ethernet switches
and checks ARP packets against a trusted database of IP-MAC address mappings. Any
ARP packets with information (in particular SHA and SPA fields) that is inconsistent with
the database is dropped. DAI uses a technique called DHCP-Snooping [144] to build and
maintain its trusted IP-MAC address database. While DAI is one of the most promising
non-cryptographic solutions to mitigate ARP spoofing attacks, its drawbacks include its pro-
prietary nature and relatively high cost [22, 145].
5.3 ARP Handling in SDN
There are two basic approaches to handling ARP in SDN. The first, which we refer to as
Regular ARP, is as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Here, a host broadcasts an ARP request on
the local network, and the host that has the matching IP address specified in the TPA field
responds with a unicast ARP reply containing its own MAC address. The role of SDN and in
particular the controller in this context is simply to provide the packet forwarding functionality.
The second approach to handle ARP in SDN is Proxy ARP, which is well suited to SDN, due
to its centralised control plane. Proxy ARP can easily be implemented in SDN by installing
rules on each SDN switch to forward any ARP request to the controller via an OpenFlow
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Packet-In message. The controller, with its global view of the network, can generate the
corresponding ARP reply message with the required MAC address of the target node. It
then encapsulates the ARP reply packet in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message and sends
it to the switch, where the request was received from together with instructions (actions) to
send it back to the sender of the ARP request message via the port where that request was
received on.
Proxy ARP handling is implemented in most SDN controllers, including POX [33], Ryu [34],
ONOS [35], Floodlight [36] and OpenDaylight [37], which we consider in our experiments.
The benefit of Proxy ARP in SDN is a significant reduction in broadcast traffic that decreases
the ARP response time, which we discuss in the next chapter. In this chapter, we consider
the security of both ARP handling approaches in SDN, i.e. Regular ARP as well as Proxy
ARP.
5.4 ARP and NDP (NS/NA) Spoofing in SDN
In order to motivate our work, we demonstrate the vulnerability of SDN to ARP and NDP
(NS/NA) spoofing attacks via experiments, for both Regular and Proxy ARP.
5.4.1 Experimental Platform
For this and all our experiments in this chapter, we used Mininet [30] and Open vSwitch
(OVS) [31]. We further used POX [33], Ryu [34], ONOS [35], Floodlight [36], and OpenDay-
light [37] as our SDN controllers. To craft ARP packets for our attacks, we used the Scapy
packet manipulation library [38] and Dsniff package [39]. Table 5.1 summaries the relevant
software tools that we used in the experiments of this chapter. All our experiments were run
on a PC (OptiPlex 9020 with a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7-4790 CPU and 16 GB of RAM), running
Ubuntu Linux 14.04 with kernel version 3.13.0. For our initial experiments, we use a simple
scenario with three switches and three hosts shown in Figure 5.2.
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Table 5.1: Software Tools used for Implementation and Experiments in Chapter 5
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.2.0
OFELIA [32] Hardware SDN Test-bed =======
Open vSwitch [31] Virtual SDN Switch 2.1.1
POX [33] SDN Controller Platform dart branch
Ryu [34] SDN Controller Platform 3.19-3.22
ONOS [35] SDN Controller Platform 1.8.5
Floodlight [36] SDN Controller Platform 1.0
OpenDaylight [37] SDN Controller Platform Carbon SR1
Scapy Library [38] Packet Manipulation Tool 2.2.0
SDN
Controller
S1 S2 S3
P2 P2 P2P3
P1 P1
h1 h3h2
P100-00-00-00-00-01
10.0.0.1
h1-eth0
00-00-00-00-00-02
10.0.0.2
h2-eth0
00-00-00-00-00-03
10.0.0.3
h3-eth0
Figure 5.2: Basic Example Scenario
5.4.2 Spoofing with Regular ARP
For the regular ARP handling case, we initially used POX as the SDN controller platform
and its l2_learning component to implement the packet forwarding functionality. With the
l2_learning controller component, OpenFlow switches emulate the behaviour of traditional
Ethernet learning switches. Consequently, ARP requests are broadcast to all hosts in the
network, and ARP replies are unicast to the originator of the ARP request.
In our example, we assume that host h1 has been compromised and wanted to poison
host h2’s ARP cache by creating an entry that maps IP address 10.0.0.3 to MAC address
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mininet> h2 arp -a  
? (10.0.0.1) at 00:00:00:00:00:01 [ether] on h2-eth0 
? (10.0.0.3) at 00:00:00:00:00:01 [ether] on h2-eth0 
Figure 5.3: Poisoned ARP Cache (Mininet)
00:00:00:00:00:01. As a result, all packets from host h2 addressed to host h3 will be sent to
the attacking host h1 instead.
We implemented the attack by crafting an ARP request with TPA=10.0.0.2, SPA=10.0.0.3,
and SHA=00:00:00:00:00:01, and injecting from host h1 to switch S1 via port P1.
Switch S1 sends the packet as an OpenFlow Packet-In message to the controller, which
then sends it back to switch S1 as an OpenFlow Packet-Out message, with an instruction
(action) to flood the packet. This is repeated on switch S2, where it is finally sent to host
h2 via port P1. Host h2 updates its ARP cache and adds an entry mapping the IP address
10.0.0.3 to the MAC address 00:00:00:00:00:01. We can verify the success of the attack by
printing h2’s ARP cache, as shown in Figure 5.3.
As a result, all packets from host h2 sent to host h3 are redirected to host h1, which dis-
rupts connectivity between host h2 and host h3, representing a DoS attack. Using the ARP
spoofing attack, an attacker can also launch a MITM attack, by additionally poisoning h3’s
ARP cache, and adding an entry which maps the IP address of host h2 to the MAC address
of the attacker h1. As a result, all traffic between hosts h2 and h3 is sent via host h1, which
can read and alter the traffic before relaying it to the intended destination node. We also
performed this attack and confirmed its feasibility in our SDN context. We further replicated
these experiments for IPv6 and NDP (NS/NA), with identical results.
To validate the feasibility of the attack on real networks, we also conducted the basic attack
on the OFELIA test-bed [32]. In our experiment, we replicated the ARP spoofing attack
scenario discussed above and shown in Figure 5.2. The difference is only in regards to
the respective host addresses, i.e. the attacking host h1 has IP address 10.216.12.56 and
MAC address 02:03:00:00:00:60, while h2 has IP address 10.216.12.58 and MAC address
02:03:00:00:00:63, and host h3 has addresses 10.216.12.57 and 02:03:00:00:00:5d.
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root@Host2:~# arp -a 
?(10.216.12.56) at 02:03:00:00:00:60 [ether] on eth0 
?(10.216.12.57) at 02:03:00:00:00:60 [ether] on eth0 
? (10.216.12.1) at 00:25:90:33:b4:bc [ether] on eth0 
Figure 5.4: Poisoned ARP Cache (OFELIA)
We were able to successfully replicate the attack on the OFELIA test-bed. Figure 5.4 shows
the spoofed ARP cache of host h2.
Our discussion of spoofing with regular ARP handling so far has been based on POX. We
also investigated regular ARP handling of other controllers, i.e. Ryu, ONOS, Floodlight, and
OpenDaylight. While Ryu implements regular ARP handling essentially in the same way as
POX, ONOS, OpenDaylight and Floodlight use a slightly different approach of forwarding
ARP requests in the network. In the case of POX and Ryu, the controller simply returns any
ARP request to the switch, where the packet was received from, with an action to flood it
via all its ports, except the ingress port. At every other switch where the ARP request is
received, this iterative process is repeated, until the entire network is covered.
Both Floodlight and OpenDaylight, operate similarly, with only slight differences in the way
ARP request packets are broadcast. In contrast, ONOS uses an approach where the con-
troller, after receiving an ARP request, will send it out to all the switches in parallel, with a
set of actions that send the packet out on all host ports. This avoids the iterative approach
of the other controllers and is hence more efficient.
Irrespective of these differences in the forwarding of ARP requests in the network, we were
able to successfully replicate the POX-based ARP spoofing attack with all the other men-
tioned controllers, which we confirmed via the hosts’ ARP caches.1
We illustrate the success of the attack via a screenshot of the Web GUI of ONOS and
Floodlight, as shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. Before the attack, we see that the
MAC address of host h1 (the attacker) is associated only with its own IP address of 10.0.0.1.
After the attack, we see that it is also associated with the IP addresses of hosts h2 and h3,
i.e. 10.0.0.2 and 10.0.0.3. As a result, traffic destined to those hosts will be redirected to
1We used the default forwarding components for all controllers, e.g. fwd for ONOS and forwarding for
Floodlight.
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(a) Before the Attack
(b) After the Attack
Figure 5.5: ARP Spoofing Attack on ONOS
(a) Before the Attack (b) After the Attack
Figure 5.6: ARP Spoofing Attack on Floodlight
host h1, and hence the attack was successful.
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mininet@mininet-vm:~/pox$ ./pox.py proto.arp_responder 
forwarding.l2_learning 
POX 0.3.0 (dart) / Copyright 2011-2014 James McCauley, et 
al. 
INFO:core:POX 0.3.0 (dart) is up. 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-03 1] connected 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-01 3] connected 
INFO:openflow.of_01:[00-00-00-00-00-02 2] connected 
INFO:proto.arp_responder:00-00-00-00-00-01 learned 10.0.0.3 
Figure 5.7: Poisoned ARP Responder Table
5.4.3 Spoofing with Proxy ARP
Proxy ARP is a commonly used approach to handling ARP in SDN since the centralised
controller is ideally placed to handle ARP requests on behalf of hosts. That has the benefit
of significantly reducing ARP traffic in the network. POX implements Proxy ARP functionality
via the arp_responder component, which we used in this experiment.
The arp_responder component works as follows. All ARP requests are sent to the controller
via an OpenFlow Packet-Inmessage. The component uses its local ARP table to look up the
matching MAC address for the address specified in the TPA field of the request and creates
an ARP reply message with this information in the SHA field. The ARP reply message is
then sent back to the switch, together with the instruction of sending it to the requesting host.
arp_responder builds its local ARP table by extracting IP-to-MAC address mappings from ob-
served ARP requests, leaving it vulnerable to ARP spoofing attacks. We launched the same
ARP poisoning attack as described in the previous section, but in this case, with the POX
arp_responder component running. Figure 5.7 shows the log file of the POX arp_responder
after the attack. The last line (in bold) shows the poisoned entry, mapping the IP address
10.0.0.3 of host h3 to the MAC address 00:00:00:00:00:01 of the attacker h1. The controller
will henceforth reply to any ARP request asking for the MAC address of host h3 with the
MAC address of host h1.
We further replicated the same ARP spoofing attack scenario on the Proxy ARP components
of ONOS and Floodlight, which work in the same way as POX’s arp_responder component.
The results were identical, and we were able to spoof the controller’s IP-to-MAC address
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mapping database.
In the following sections, we discuss two countermeasures which aim to mitigate against the
above shown ARP poisoning attacks in the specific context of SDN.
5.5 Countermeasure 1: SARP_DAI
We present SARP_DAI, our adoption of Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), to the context of
SDN. The goal of SARP_DAI is not to provide ARP handling itself, but to transparently
provide security for existing ARP handling mechanisms. DAI relies on a trusted database
of IP-MAC address mappings. ARP packets with invalid information, i.e. SPA and SHA
pairs that are inconsistent with the trusted database, are discarded. This checking of ARP
packets in DAI is implemented in Ethernet switches. This is not practical in SDN, due to the
limited ‘intelligence’ and feature set of OpenFlow switches. We, therefore, need to push this
functionality to the SDN controller. In order to be able to check every single ARP packet,
we install a high priority OpenFlow rule on each switch, which sends ARP packets to the
controller.
In traditional networks, DAI maintains its trusted database of IP-MAC address mappings
with methods such as DHCP-Snooping [144]. While DHCP-Snooping can be implemented
in SDN, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our implementation, we simply assume
that we have such a trusted database (arp_db) of IP and MAC address pairs.
We implemented SARP_DAI as a separate component in the POX controller platform. We
configured the SARP_DAI POX component with the highest priority, which ensures that its
Packet-In event handler is called before any other components. Algorithm 1 shows the basic
processing of ARP packets by the SARP_DAI component.
If the received packet is an ARP packet, and the address specified in the SPA field is in our
trusted database arp_db (line 2), we look up the corresponding value for SHA (line 3). If the
SHA value in the packet does not match the corresponding value in the database, we drop
the ARP packet (lines 4 and 5). If, however, the information in the ARP packet is consistent
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Algorithm 1 SARP_DAI
1: for all received pkt do
2: if pkt.type = ARP ∧ pkt.arp.spa ∈ arp_db then
3: shatrusted ← lookupSHA(arp_db, pkt.arp.spa)
4: if pkt.arp.sha ̸= shatrusted then
5: drop ARP packet
6: else
7: continue
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
with the value in arp_db, the packet handling routine returns, and the packet is passed to the
next POX Packet-In event handler in the chain.
As mentioned, SARP_DAI relies on the availability of a trusted list of IP-to-MAC address
mappings. If this is available, it is clear that SARP_DAI can successfully prevent any ARP
spoofing attack, since it can easily identify and drop any ARP packet with spoofed and invalid
information, i.e. the SPA and SHA fields. This requires that every single ARP packet is sent
to the SDN controller, which incurs overhead and cost. In the following, we discuss and
experimentally quantify this cost of SARP_DAI.
5.5.1 SARP_DAI Overhead
To evaluate the overhead and cost of SARP_DAI, we have performed a number of experi-
ments using the experimental environment described in Section 5.4.1. We considered two
overhead metrics in our evaluation, the additional CPU load generated at the controller by
our SARP_DAI component, as well as the additional end-to-end Round Trip Time (RTT)
measured via ping. Since we delete the ARP cache prior to each ping, the RTT gives us
an indication of the increased delay caused by SARP_DAI. For our experiments, we defined
two network topologies in Mininet, a linear topology of 64 switches and hosts, as shown in
Figure 5.8, and a tree topology with nine switches and 64 hosts, with eight hosts connected
to each of the eight access switches, as shown in Figure 5.9.
We evaluated the overhead for both Regular ARP handling as well as Proxy ARP. For the
Regular ARP case, we used POX’s l2_learning component to provide packet forwarding
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Figure 5.8: Linear Topology
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Figure 5.9: Tree Topology
functionality. For the Proxy ARP case, we used the arp_responder POX component. In
our experiments, we generated 500 ARP requests per second at a constant rate. This
corresponds to an ARP load of a reasonably large network. All ARP requests were initiated
by host h1 and sent to hosts h2, h3, ..., h64 consecutively and continuously.
Figure 5.10 shows the average controller CPU load during our experiment. It is important
to note that the absolute values are not that relevant here since they are determined largely
by the level of the ARP load as well as the hardware. We are more interested in the relative
increase in load due to our proposed security mechanism.
For the linear topology and Regular ARP handling, we see that the CPU load increases
from around 22% to just over 41%. In the Proxy ARP case, the increase is from 4% to just
under 10%. Not surprisingly, Proxy ARP creates a much smaller controller load compared
to Regular ARP, since each ARP request is only handled once by the controller. In contrast,
in Regular ARP along with the l2_learning component, each ARP packet is sent to the
controller for checking at each switch along the path. The linear topology represents the
worst case scenario for this since it has maximum length paths.
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Figure 5.10: Controller CPU Load (SARP_DAI)
For the tree topology, we see a lower absolute CPU load, due to a shorter average path
length. The increase in CPU load due to SARP_DAI for Regular ARP is from 8% to 14%.
The corresponding increase for Proxy ARP is from 4% to 5%. In summary, we can say
SARP_DAI imposes a significant computational load increase on the controller compared to
traditional ARP handling. This is unavoidable, due to the centralised nature of SDN, where
ARP packet checking can only be done at the controller.
In addition to the impact on controller CPU load, we also measured the additional end-to-
end delay caused by SARP_DAI. We run ping from host h1, sending ICMP echo requests
consecutively to all other hosts h2, h3, ..., h64. Since we delete the ARP cache every time
before a new ICMP echo request is sent, we measure the time of the ICMP echo reply and
request, as well as the time of the ARP exchange. Assuming that the transmission and
processing time for the ICMP packets are the same no matter if SARP_DAI is enabled or
not, we can use the difference in the RTT measurements as an indication of the additional
delay incurred by SARP_DAI.
Figure 5.11 shows the RTT results for the linear topology for our four scenarios: Regular
ARP, Regular ARP + SARP_DAI, Proxy ARP and Proxy ARP + SARP_DAI. As mentioned
above, host h1 is the originator of all ICMP echo requests and ARP requests. The x-axis
in the figure represents the host ID of the target host, ranging from hosts h2 to h64. As
expected, we see a linear increase of the RTT with the index of the destination node. For
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Figure 5.11: RTT in Linear Topology (SARP_DAI)
our linear topology, this directly corresponds to the path length. The absolute values of the
RTT are very high, for all the four variants considered. This is largely due to the somewhat
inefficient implementation of the l2_learning component, which forwards each broadcast
packet to the controller, at every switch along the path. Consequently, the RTT for Proxy
ARP is smaller since only the ICMP packet needs to be forwarded across the multiple hops,
whereas the ARP request is directly answered by the controller via the first switch. As above,
our focus is not on the absolute values, but rather on the relative increase due to SARP_DAI
compared to the corresponding scenario without it. For Regular ARP, the increase is on
average 12%, and for Proxy ARP, it is 16%.
Figure 5.12 shows the corresponding results for the tree topology. The key difference here
is that we do not have a linear increase with the path length, but rather a bimodal behaviour,
with a low delay for destination hosts h2 to h8, and a higher, roughly constant delay for
destination hosts h9 to h64. This is due to the fact that hosts h2 to h8 are attached to the
same access switch as host h1, the sender of all ARP requests, and hence only one switch
needs to be traversed by all packets.
As expected in this case, Regular ARP has higher RTTs, since ARP packets are exchanged
end-to-end between hosts, instead of being answered by the controller via the first switch in
the path. Again, we focus on the relative increase in the RTT due to SARP_DAI instead of
the absolute values. Average increase of the RTT caused by SARP_DAI for Regular ARP is
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Figure 5.12: RTT in Tree Topology (SARP_DAI)
1%. For Proxy ARP it is 9%.
Similar to the CPU overhead, SARP_DAI also causes a significant increase in the delay of
the ARP request/reply exchange, as measured via ping in our experiment. As mentioned
above, this is due to the architecture of SDN and its centralised control plane.
However, it is easy to see that SARP_DAI is secure and can prevent the ARP spoofing
attacks, as long as it has a trusted mapping of all IP and MAC address pairs, against which
all ARP packets can be checked. Such as trusted database might not easily be available in
all cases. In the following section, we explore a mitigation strategy that does not assume or
rely on such a trusted database.
5.6 Countermeasure 2: SARP_NAT
In SARP_DAI, we assumed that the trusted mapping of IP-to-MAC addresses, which can be
used to check the validity of every ARP packet is provided. However, such a trusted mapping
might not be available in all scenarios. In this section, we propose a different method to mit-
igate against ARP spoofing attacks in SDN, which does not require any externally acquired
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Algorithm 2 SARP_NAT
1: for all received pkt do
2: if pkt.type = ARP.REQUEST then
3: add entry in pend_req list
4: pkt.arp.spa = spasa f e
5: pkt.arp.sha = shasa f e
6: end if
7: if pkt.Type = ARP.REPLY then
8: if pkt /∈ pend_req then
9: Gratuitous ARP reply, drop
10: else
11: pkt.arp.tpa = lookupSPA(pend_req, pkt.arp.spa)
12: pkt.arp.tha = lookupSHA(pend_req, pkt.arp.spa)
13: deleteEntry(pend_req, TPA)
14: addEntry(handled_req, pkt, thandled)
15: send ARP reply to pkt.arp.tha via Packet-Out
16: if pkt ∈ handled_req then
17: expSHA = lookupSHA(handled_req, pkt.arp.spa)
18: if pkt.arp.sha ̸= expSHA then
19: Duplicate ARP reply attack detected, drop
20: Delete potentially poisoned host ARP cache
21: else
22: Genuine duplicate ARP reply, drop
23: end if
24: else
25: Gratuitous ARP reply, Drop Packet
26: end if
27: end if
28: end if
29: end for
trusted ARP database. As before, the goal is to implement a controller component, which
does not handle ARP itself, but provides security for ARP handling in SDN, in particular
Regular ARP and Proxy ARP.
As mentioned, ARP spoofing attacks occur either via ARP request or reply messages. In
both cases, the attacker spoofs the SPA and SHA fields in the ARP message to create
an invalid address mapping. The key idea of our proposed mechanism is to prevent the
potentially spoofed information in the SHA and SPA fields to come into contact with any
hosts and thereby poisoning of their ARP cache. Similarly, in the Proxy ARP case, we want
to avoid potentially poisoned information in the SPA and SHA fields to come into contact
with an ARP handling controller component, i.e. the POX’s arp-responder component that
will implicitly trust this information. Our proposed solution is loosely inspired by Network
Address Translation (NAT), and we therefore call it SARP_NAT. As in the case of SARP_DAI,
in SARP_NAT ARP packets received by an SDN switch are sent to the controller. Algorithm 2
shows the packet processing of SARP_NAT at the controller and is explained below.
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5.6.1 ARP Request based Attack
To explain the basic operation of SARP_NAT, we consider the scenario shown in Figure 5.2
and refer to the relevant lines in Algorithm 2. We assume the Regular ARP handling is used,
and host h1 attempts to launch the same ARP request based spoofing attack, described in
Section 5.4.2, by injecting a poisoned ARP request with an invalid SPA field to switch S1.
Due to a pre-installed rule at the switch, the ARP request is sent to the controller, where it is
first handled by the SARP_NAT component. The SARP_NAT component stores each ARP
request in a list of pending ARP requests (pend_req), consisting of the following 6-tuples
for each entry: (tpa, spa, sha, s, in_port, trec) (line 3 in Algorithm 2). The elements tpa, spa
and sha represent the corresponding fields in the ARP request, s and in_port represent the
switch ID and ingress port via which the request was received, and trec is the time at which
the request was received.
The SARP_NAT component then ‘sanitises’ the ARP request message by overwriting the
potentially poisoned fields SPA and SHA, with safe dummy values, spasa f e and shasa f e (lines
4,5). These safe values are constant and can be any IP and MAC address pair that is
not used on the local network. In our implementation, we used spasa f e = 11.11.11.11 and
shasa f e = 00:11:22:33:44:55. The Target Protocol Address (TPA) remains unchanged. The
SARP_NAT component then passes the sanitised ARP packet to the next controller compo-
nent or the event handler for processing. If we are using Regular ARP handling and a corre-
sponding forwarding component, this will result in the ARP request packet being broadcast
in the network, where it will eventually be received by host h2, the target node (TPA).
According to the pre-installed ARP rule, each ARP packet is sent to the controller for check-
ing. However, this is not necessary for packets that have been sanitised by the SARP_NAT
component and contain safe SPA and SHA values of spasa f e and shasa f e. We, therefore,
modify the default ARP forwarding rule to specify that ARP packets with safe values are
exempted, and are being forwarded as the normal forwarding rules.
If we assume Regular ARP handling, the ARP request is forwarded to the target host with
IP address TPA, host h2 in our example. Host h2 then parses the ARP request packet and
adds the specified SPA-SHA mapping in its ARP cache. This is the point where normally the
ARP spoofing attack would have succeeded. However, in this case, host h2 simply adds the
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safe dummy values to its ARP cache, which has no impact.
When host h2 creates an ARP reply message, it assumes that it is responding to the (non-
existent) host with IP address spasa f e and MAC address shasa f e, and initialises the ARP
reply accordingly, i.e. with TPA=spasa f e and THA= shasa f e. According to the standard ARP
behaviour, the sender of the ARP reply (h2) initialises the fields SPA and SHA with its own
IP and MAC address, in our example SPA=10.0.0.2 and SHA=00:00:00:00:00:02. The ARP
reply is then sent as a unicast frame via switch S2. Since the SPA and SHA fields are not
the safe values spasa f e and shasa f e, the ARP reply is forwarded to the controller by switch
S2, where it is processed by the SARP_NAT component. For an ARP reply, SARP_NAT first
checks if it is a reply to a genuine request, i.e. if it is in pend_req (line 8). If that is not the
case, we have a gratuitous ARP reply, which we cannot trust and therefore drop. If, however,
the ARR reply matches an entry in pend_req, the component performs the reverse address
translation, by replacing the dummy values in the TPA and THA fields with the original values
stored in pend_req, consisting of the set of (tpa, spa, sha, s, in_port, trec) 6-tuples (lines 11,12).
In our example, the values are set as follows: TPA=10.0.0.3 and THA=00:00:00:00:00:01.
The corresponding entry is now deleted from pend_req (line 13), and a new entry is created
in a list of handled ARP requests handled_req (line 14).2 In addition to the information in
pend_req, the list handled_req also contains the resolved MAC address obtained from the
ARP reply, as well as the time when the reply was received. We discuss how this is used
below. Finally, the ARP reply is directly forwarded to host h1, via an OpenFlow Packet-Out
message to s = S1, with instructions to send it out via port in_port, i.e. port P1 in this case
(line 15). The processing by SARP_NAT is completely transparent to hosts, and h1 receives
the same reply as it would have sent via the traditional ARP handling approach.
The above discussion considered the case of Regular ARP handling. The proposed
SARP_NAT mechanism can also be used for Proxy ARP handling. This required minor
modifications arp_responder component in our implementation. Normally, arp_responder
implicitly trusts the information in the SPA and SHA fields in any ARP request it receives
from switches, and the (potentially poisoned) information is used to update its local ARP ta-
ble. We modify arp_responder to only trust and use IP-MAC address mappings in ARP reply
messages which are sent in response to a genuine ARP request. This prevents spoofing
attacks using ARP request messages against Proxy ARP handling. Attacks based on ARP
2The entry has a time out of tdup, after which it is deleted from the list.
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reply messages will be discussed below.
5.6.2 ARP Reply based Attack
In most ARP implementations, ARP spoofing can be done simply via gratuitous ARP replies,
i.e. by sending an unsolicited reply to a host. To prevent such attacks, SARP_NAT will only
accept ARP replies for which it has seen a corresponding request, i.e. for which there is an
entry in the list of pending ARP requests pend_req. If this is not the case, it simply drops the
ARP reply (line 9).
To avoid this check, an attacker could simply respond to a genuine ARP request with a
spoofed reply. In this case, the SARP_NAT component receives two ARP replies with differ-
ent values for the SHA field, one from the genuine target host, and one from the attacker.
Unfortunately, it is impossible for the SARP_NAT component to determine which one is the
genuine reply and which one is the spoofed one. SARP_NAT simply accepts the first ARP
reply it sees for a pending request, processes and forwards it. In addition, it enters the in-
formation in the reply into its handled_req list (line 14), in particular the corresponding SHA
value and the time it was received.
If during a given time window tdup another ARP reply for the same request is received, but
with a different IP-to-MAC address mapping (lines 17-19), a duplicate ARP reply attack is
detected. Since it is not possible to determine which of the ARP replies was spoofed, we
make the conservative assumption that it was the first one forwarded to the host.
To mitigate the impact, the SARP_NAT component overwrites the potentially poisoned entry
in the host’s ARP cache by sending a new ARP reply with the same SPA but the safe value
shasa f e (line 20). This stops any packets from being forwarded to the potentially wrong MAC
address, thereby preventing a MITM attack. As a downside, it also prevents the host from
communicating to the target host, until the next, valid ARP reply is received. The only way
for this kind of attack to go undetected is if the attacker can prevent the genuine host from
sending its valid ARP reply. This, however, is a significant challenge and greatly raises the
bar for an ARP spoofing attack. SARP_NAT’s protection against ARP reply based spoofing
attacks works for both Regular ARP handling as well as Proxy ARP handling.
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Figure 5.13: Controller CPU Load (SARP_NAT)
5.6.3 SARP_NAT Overhead
In order to evaluate the overhead imposed by SARP_NAT, we performed the same set of
experiments we did for SARP_DAI. Figure 5.13 shows the average controller CPU load
for the scenarios with and without SARP_NAT running. As in the case of SARP_DAI, we
considered Regular ARP and Proxy ARP, for both our linear and tree topology.
We consider the results for the linear topology first. Surprisingly, we see that for Regular
ARP, running SARP_NAT results in a significant reduction in CPU load. This is due to the
fact that we install a rule which immediately forwards broadcast ARP request packets that
have been ’sanitised’ by the controller, instead of sending them to the controller at every
switch, as is the behaviour POX’s l2_learning component. In this case, adding security has
the benefit of a significant controller overhead reduction, without sacrificing any generality of
the solution. For Proxy ARP, SARP_NAT does not provide any reduction in CPU load, since
the packet forwarding is the same for both cases. Here, we see that SARP_NAT minimally
increases the CPU load by well below 1%.
For the tree topology and Regular ARP, we also see a reduction in CPU load due to
SARP_NAT. However, the reduction is smaller compared to the linear topology since the
average path length is shorter, resulting in less number of OpenFlow Packet-In messages
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Figure 5.15: RTT in Tree Topology (SARP_NAT)
processed by the controller. For Proxy ARP, we see a small load increase of less than 1%.
We also measured the impact of SARP_NAT on the RTT, using the same scenario as for
SARP_DAI. Figure 5.14 shows the results for the linear topology. We see that Regular ARP
without SARP_NAT has the highest overall RTT values, due to the forwarding behaviour
of the l2_learning component. The advantage of SARP_NAT is reflected here, with a re-
duction of 32% on average compared to the basic Regular ARP case. For Proxy ARP,
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SARP_NAT imposes a minimal overhead of 2% on average. For the tree topology scenario
in Figure 5.15, we see a smaller efficiency gain of SARP_NAT over basic Regular ARP of
an average of 13%, as expected. For Proxy ARP, SARP_NAT processing at the controller
results in a small increase in the RTT by 10% on average compared to the basic Proxy ARP
case.
Overall, we can say that SARP_NAT achieves a significant performance gain over the basic
Regular ARP case, and imposes a minimal overhead for Proxy ARP.
5.6.4 Comparison with SARP_DAI
In this subsection, we provide a brief qualitative and quantitative comparison of SARP_NAT
with SARP_DAI.
The important point to stress here is that neither SARP_NAT nor SARP_DAI aim to provide
ARP handling functionality. They are orthogonal to the provisioning of ARP handling, and
simply provide a layer of security for whatever ARP handling approach is chosen.
As mentioned above, the key advantage of SARP_NAT compared to SARP_DAI is that it
does not rely on a trusted database of IP-to-MAC address mappings to distinguish spoofed
ARP packets from legitimate ones. This makes it a lot easier and practical to deploy in a
production network.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide a direct quantitative comparison of SARP_NAT with SARP_DAI
in terms of controller CPU overhead as well as the RTT. The tables provide a different view
of the experimental results shown and discussed in this and the previous section, with the
aim of providing a direct comparison of SARP_NAT and SARP_DAI.
Table 5.2 shows that controller CPU overhead (in %) of SARP_NAT is consistently lower
than for SARP_DAI, and the difference is particularly significant for Regular ARP and the
linear topology scenario. This can be attributed to the reduction in the number of OpenFlow
Packet-In messages processed by the controller in the case of SARP_NAT.
74
Chapter 5: Security of Address Resolution Protocol
Table 5.2: Controller CPU Load Comparison
SARP_DAI SARP_NAT
Topology Regular ARP Proxy ARP Regular ARP Proxy ARP
Linear 41.3% 9.6% 6.5% 4.2%
Tree 13.7% 5.2% 6.4% 4.8%
Table 5.3: Round Trip Time Comparison
SARP_DAI SARP_NAT
Topology Regular ARP Proxy ARP Regular ARP Proxy ARP
Linear +12% +16% -32% +2%
Tree +1% +9% -13% +10%
Table 5.3 shows the corresponding table for the RTT measurements. The numbers (in
%) show the relative increase or decrease in the RTT due to SARP_NAT or SARP_DAI,
compared to the reference case without any ARP security mechanism in place.
With the exception of the Proxy ARP and the tree topology case, where SARP_DAI has a
slightly lower RTT overhead (9% vs 10%), SARP_NAT outperforms SARP_DAI in all other
scenarios. This difference is particularly significant, for Regular ARP, where SARP_NAT
even manages to lower the RTT value, due to the more efficient forwarding of ARP mes-
sages, as discussed earlier in this chapter.
Overall, we can say that SARP_NAT provides better performance and a lower overhead
compared to SARP_DAI. This is in addition to its benefit of not relying on a trusted IP-to-
MAC database.
5.7 Related Works
The problem of ARP security has been well studied and discussed in the context of traditional
networks, and we discussed the corresponding key works in Section 5.2.3. Here, we discuss
works which consider the problem of ARP spoofing in the specific context of SDN, and
are hence more closely related to our work. For our discussion, we classify the proposed
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approaches into two separate categories. The first category, which we refer to as DAI-
like Approaches, relies on a trusted IP-MAC address database to check the validity and
integrity of ARP packets in the network. This is the same basic idea used in our proposed
SARP-DAI module. The second category, Proxy ARP-based Approaches, proposes a central
Proxy ARP handler at the controller. The assumption here is, as in the DAI-like Approaches,
that a trusted IP-MAC address mapping is available, based on which ARP requests can be
answered. This is in contrast to our proposed SARP_NAT, which is separate from the ARP
handling mechanism, and can protect ARP packets without relying on a trusted IP-MAC
database. In the following, we briefly discuss key recent papers for these two categories.
5.7.1 DAI-like Approaches
The authors of [146] propose a method for mitigating ARP spoofing attacks by validating ARP
request and reply packets based on a number of consistency checks, e.g. the mechanism
verifies if the MAC source and destination addresses in the Ethernet header are consistent
with the corresponding addresses in the ARP payload. The most important rule is the one
that checks if the IP-MAC address mapping in the ARP packet is consistent with the one in
the trusted database.
SPHINX [128], as discussed in Chapter 3, is a proposal to detect a range of attacks against
SDN, including ARP poisoning. As the previous approach, SPHINX relies on a trusted IP-
MAC address mapping database, against which each ARP packet in the network is validated
by the controller. The paper has a broad scope, and ARP spoofing represents only a small
subsection. As a result, the approach is discussed in only limited technical detail, and no
quantitative evaluation is provided.
In [147], a similar ARP poisoning mitigation method is proposed. While the authors provide
some basic functional evaluation via experiments, they do not consider the overhead and
impact on network performance of the proposed approach.
The same concept is presented in FICUR [148], an approach to observe ARP traffic and
seek to protect the SDN controller against various ARP attacks. The main weakness of
those studies is the failure to prevent the ARP spoofing attack deployed via an ARP reply
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message, which the attacker could easily spoof and accomplish the ARP spoofing attack.
It has taken no account of that the first packets received by the controller could be already
spoofed, which in this case the database would eventually include wrong information.
All the above works propose the same basic idea to prevent ARP poisoning or spoofing, by
adopting the concept of DAI [25] to the SDN context, which is essentially the same as our
SARP_DAI approach.
In contrast to our work, none of the papers mentioned above provide an experimental and
quantitative evaluation of the computational overhead on the controller of this approach
(DAI), as well as its impact on network performance, i.e. end-to-end Round Trip Time (RTT).
5.7.2 Proxy ARP-based Approaches
In [149], the authors propose a centralised approach to ARP handling in SDN, with the
main aim of improving efficiency and reducing overhead, which it successfully achieves.
All ARP requests are sent to the SDN controller, which then creates ARP replies based
on its IP-MAC address database. The paper specifically considers a data centre scenario,
and assumes that the database is available from "the data centre management framework".
While the paper does not specifically consider the security aspects of ARP handling, it could
be extended to do so and form the basis of a secure Proxy ARP handler. Since all ARP
requests are handled centrally and the trusted IP-MAC database is available, the controller
is able to provide trusted and valid ARP replies. However, the approach would need to be
extended in regards to the handling of gratuitous ARP replies, and a mechanism would need
to be provided to guarantee that potentially spoofed ARP request messages are quarantined
from other hosts. Furthermore, if the approach was to be generalised for other types of
network scenarios, another way would need to be found to establish the trusted IP-MAC
address mapping.
In [150], the author briefly investigates the security issues with the current implementation
of ARP and attempts to reduce ARP broadcast traffic via centralised ARP handling. In con-
trast to [149], ARP requests are not handled by the controller, but by a dedicated server
instead, which also handles DHCP requests. In this approach, OpenFlow rules are installed
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on all switches dropping all ARP replies which are not originating from the ARP server. The
proposed approach also relies on a trusted database of IP-MAC address mappings. The au-
thor suggests that this information can be learned by simply observing network traffic, and
extract the IP-MAC address pairs from packets. The problem with this method is that the
initially observed packets can already be spoofed, which then poisons the database. An-
other limitation of the proposal is its dependency on DHCP, and its reliance on an additional
dedicated server, which is in addition to the standard SDN infrastructure.
More recently, the authors of [151] propose a centralised ARP handling approach via the
SDN controller, with the aim of preventing ARP spoofing attacks. The approach in [151] for-
wards all ARP request to the controller. If the controller has the required IP-MAC mapping, it
will create the corresponding ARP reply message. Otherwise, the ARP request is broadcast
as in the regular ARP handling approach. The problem is that this approach still allows ARP
poisoning via ARP request packets since only ARP reply messages are checked. Further-
more, the approach also relies on observing the ARP packets in the network to build up its
IP-MAC database. The paper does not provide a solution to the problem of trust bootstrap-
ping, since the initial ARP packets could already be spoofed.
In [152], a distributed ARP handling approach for SDN is proposed, where multiple DR-ARP
responder entities are in charge of handling ARP requests. The motivation for a distributed
approach is not made very clear, especially since a centralised approach, e.g. via the con-
troller, seems a natural fit for SDN. The proposed method requires ARP requests to be
tagged with meta-data, e.g. the switch ingress port. Furthermore, the approach requires a
subset of all network traffic to be mirrored to the DR-ARP entities, in order for them to learn
the IP-MAC address mapping. This raises questions about the practicality and scalability of
the approach, in addition to the problem of trust bootstrapping, which is not addressed.
In summary, the above approaches propose to handle ARP requests via Proxy ARP, where
ARP replies are created based on a database of IP-MAC address mappings. The security of
these approaches relies on the availability of a trusted source of information to populate the
database. This is a very challenging problem, and none of the discussed papers provides a
solution that is generic and provides absolute security guarantees.
This is in contrast to our SARP_NAT approach, which does not handle ARP request itself,
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but provides a layer of security to the ARP handling mechanism. The key distinction and
benefit of SARP_NAT compared to all these related approaches is that it does not rely on
the availability of a trusted IP-MAC address database. Finally, none of the related works have
provided an experimental evaluation of the computational cost of their proposed mechanism,
as is provided in this chapter for both SARP_DAI and SARP_NAT.
5.8 Conclusions
While SARP_DAI, an adoption of an existing solution used in traditional networks, can suc-
cessfully prevent all such attacks, it imposes a significant overhead on the controller, and it
relies on a trusted database of IP-to-MAC address mappings. Since this cannot always be
assumed, we presented SARP_NAT, an active, SDN-specific mitigation approach that does
not rely on any trusted a-priori information. SARP_NAT can defend against ARP request
based spoofing attacks, and against gratuitous ARP reply attacks. While it is impossible to
prevent attacks based on ARP replies sent to genuine ARP requests, SARP_NAT can detect
such duplicate ARP reply attacks and mitigate the impact by overwriting the affected host’s
ARP cache. SARP_NAT’s active address translation approach provides a novel solution to
the problem of ARP spoofing in SDN.
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6.1 Introduction
Layer 3 to Layer 2 address mapping is a critical functionality in packet switched networks.
In IPv4, this service is provided via the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and in IPv6
via Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP). While our discussions in this chapter focus on
ARP, our proposed method can equally be applied to NDP in IPv6, in particular Neighbour
Solicitation (NS) and Neighbour Announcement (NA).
ARP imposes a significant overhead on Ethernet networks. For example, [153] reports that
ARP traffic represents 88% of all broadcast traffic. Efficient handling of ARP is therefore
critical for the scalability of networks. In the context of SDN, a widely used approach to
handle ARP and address the problem of extensive broadcast traffic is by using Proxy ARP,
where the SDN controller handles ARP requests on behalf of hosts. While Proxy ARP in
SDN manages to reduce the ARP induced broadcast traffic, it places a significant load on
the controller, limiting overall network performance and scalability and making the entire
network vulnerable to DoS attacks [154].
To address this problem, we explore the idea of offloading Proxy ARP functionality from the
control plane (SDN controller) to the data plane (switches). We refer to our proposed solution
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as Switch-based Proxy ARP (SProxy ARP).
For our work, we assume an SDN with an OpenFlow-based southbound interface [2]. Open-
Flow provides a very limited interface to program switch functionality via its basic match-
action paradigm. This chapter demonstrates how the limited OpenFlow interface can be
utilised to successfully implement SProxy ARP, without requiring any further, non-standard
modifications to switches.
Our experimental evaluations show the potential performance benefits of SProxy ARP, with
a reduction of ARP response time of more than an order of magnitude, while providing a
significant reduction of controller load.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the state-of-the-art
in ARP handling in SDN, and Section 6.3 describes SProxy ARP and its implementation.
Section 7.4 briefly describes our experimental platforms and Section 6.5 presents our eval-
uation results. Section 6.6 discusses the memory-performance trade off in SProxy ARP.
Section 8.4 discusses related works, and Section 8.8 concludes the chapter.
6.2 ARP Handling in SDN
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are two basic methods for handling ARP in OpenFlow-
based SDNs. The first method, which we call Regular ARP, in which a host broadcasts an
ARP request on the local subnet, and the host with the IP address specified in the TPA field
responds with a unicast ARP reply containing its own MAC address as the answer. There
is nothing SDN-specific in this approach, and it works as in traditional networks. The role
of the SDN controller here is just to provide the packet forwarding functionality, e.g. via a
learning switch component, for ARP request and ARP reply messages between hosts. This
approach suffers from the same problem of high broadcast traffic load as is the case in
traditional networks.
The second approach to handle ARP in SDN is via Proxy ARP. In this case, ARP requests
are sent to the controller when they are received at a switch from a host. The controller
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maintains a database of IP-MAC address mappings and is then able to directly create the
corresponding ARP reply message. This ARP reply is sent back to the switch, encapsulated
in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message, together with the instruction of sending it out to the
ingress port via which the ARP request was received. This approach is well suited to the
centralised nature of SDN. The key benefit is that it avoids excessive broadcast traffic in
the network and the associated overhead. However, a key drawback of this approach is the
increased controller load, since the controller needs to handle every single ARP request, in
addition to handling other load.
Proxy ARP is widely used in SDN and is implemented by most SDN controller platforms.
Our investigations showed that the following controllers support Proxy ARP: POX [33], Ryu
[34], ONOS [35], Floodlight [36], OpenDaylight [37], and Beacon [121].
In the following section, we discuss SProxy ARP, our simple and practical proposal to miti-
gate the key limitations of Proxy ARP in SDN.
6.3 Switch-based Proxy ARP (SProxy ARP)
The key idea in SProxy ARP is to offload the ARP handling functionality, at least partially,
from the control plane (SDN controller) to the data plane (switches).
In SProxy ARP, the switch directly replies to the ARP request with the corresponding ARP
reply message, without involving the controller. The problem is that OpenFlow provides
a very narrow interface to program switch functionality, limited to basic primitives that can
be implemented, via its match-action paradigm. For example, OpenFlow does not provide
a mechanism to create a new message in response to another message. Furthermore,
its packet matching functionality is generally limited to packet headers and does not allow
access to payload information. However, since OpenFlow version 1.3, there is an important
exception to this rule, i.e. ARP payload fields such as SPA, SHA, TPA, THA, etc. are added
as match fields. Since OpenFlow supports the operation of rewriting of packet fields that are
defined as match fields, this mechanism allows us to answer ARP requests at the switch.
We are able to rewrite the fields of the ARP request to convert it into the corresponding ARP
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Algorithm 3 SProxy ARP Request Processing
1: for all received pkt do
2: if pkt.type = ARP ∧ pkt.arp.operation=1 then
3: THA← lookupMAC(pkt.arp.tpa)
4: TPA← pkt.arp.tpa
5: SHA← pkt.arp.sha
6: SPA← pkt.arp.spa
7: pkt.op← 2
8: pkt.eth_src← THA
9: pkt.eth_dst← SHA
10: pkt.arp.tpa← SPA
11: pkt.arp.tha← SHA
12: pkt.arp.spa← TPA
13: pkt.arp.sha← THA
14: end if
15: end for
reply message and send it back to the host, via the ingress port on which the ARP request
was received.
The process is shown in Algorithm 3. If the packet is an ARP request (line 2), we look up the
value for THA in the local IP-MAC database and store it as the temporary variable THA (line
3). We also read the values of TPA, SHA and SPA from the ARP payload and store them
in temporary variables (lines 4-6). Now we convert the packet from an ARP request into an
ARP reply by rewriting the operation field (line 7). Next, we set the source and destination
MAC address of the Ethernet frame which carries the ARP payload to the value of THA and
SHA respectively (lines 8-9). Finally, the TPA, THA, SPA, and SHA fields of the converted
ARP reply messages are set accordingly (lines 10-13), as discussed in Chapter 5.
Unfortunately, we cannot directly implement Algorithm 3 in OpenFlow, since it does not sup-
port a database and lookup mechanism (line 3), nor does it support variables (lines 3-6).
Instead, we need to install a dedicated OpenFlow rule for each TPA we want to handle at
the switch, with the corresponding values for THA, SHA and SPA ’hard-coded’ in the rules
as literals. To illustrate this, Figure 6.1 shows an example of such an OpenFlow rule, defined
for a TPA of 10.0.0.2, with its corresponding match and action components. Lines 1 and 2
represent the match rules, and lines 3-11 are the corresponding actions.1
Line 1 in the figure matches on ARP request packets, corresponding to line 1 in Algorithm 3,
1The syntax used in the figure is as provided by the dpctl tool, we only add the line breaks and line numbers.
83
Chapter 6: Efficient Address Resolution Protocol Handling
1:    arp, arp_op=1  
2:    arp_tpa=10.0.0.2 
3:    actions= 
4:    set_field:2->arp_op 
5:    set_field:00:00:00:00:00:02->eth_src 
6:    set_field:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff->eth_dst 
7:    set_field:10.0.0.2->arp_spa 
8:    set_field:00:00:00:00:00:02->arp_sha 
9:    set_field:10.255.255.255->arp_tpa 
10:  set_field:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff->arp_tha 
11:  IN_PORT 
Figure 6.1: Example OpenFlow Rule for SProxy ARP
and Line 2 matches on a particular value of TPA (10.0.0.2), in this example. The rest of the
rule specifies the actions for initialising the ARP reply for this particular IP address.2 From
line 3 onwards, we see the OpenFlow actions for creating, initialising and forwarding the
corresponding ARP reply message. Line 4 sets the ARP type to ’reply’. Line 5 in Figure 6.1
sets the Ethernet source MAC address as the hard-coded value corresponding to the TPA
of 10.0.0.2, which is 00:00:00:00:00:02 in this example. Line 6 sets the destination MAC
address of the Ethernet frame as the broadcast address. This differs from the corresponding
line 9 in Algorithm 3, where we use the corresponding unicast address. Due to the limitation
of OpenFlow, we cannot copy that value from the ARP request packet, and we, therefore,
need to use the broadcast address as a constant, hard-coded value. Similarly, we need
to use the corresponding broadcast address for the values of TPA and THA. While this
is a deviation from the regular approach to initiate ARP replies, it provides the identical
functionality. Finally, line 11 in Figure 6.1 tells the switch to send the ’ARP request-turned-
ARP reply’ packet out to port IN_PORT, i.e. the ingress port, where the request was received
on.
For SProxy ARP, we assume that the controller maintains a database of IP-MAC address
mappings, as implemented in traditional Proxy ARP, i.e. via DHCP-Snooping [155] or via
learning the information from passively observing data packets. The controller decides for
2As mentioned previously, this approach requires the installation of a separate rule for each TPA to be
handled at the switch.
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which IP addresses (TPAs), a corresponding rule for ARP handling is to be installed on the
switches. For now, we assume a rule is installed for each TPA, which means that all ARP
requests can be handled by the switch. In Section 6.6, we discuss the consequences of
relaxing that assumption. We implement SProxy ARP as a separate component in the Ryu
controller platform.
6.4 Experimental Platform
We evaluated SProxy ARP both in an emulated network using Mininet [30], as well as a
dedicated hardware test-bed. For our experiments, we configured the simple scenario shown
in Figure 6.2, with an SDN controller running Ryu, an OpenFlow switch S1 and two hosts h1
and h2.
Since we are evaluating the performance of Proxy ARP, there is no need to consider more
complex topologies. In fact, the basic process of handling ARP requests from a host involves
only the corresponding access switch and the controller and is therefore independent of the
rest of the network. We further used the PackETH tool [40] to generate an ARP request from
host h1 to host h2 at various rates.
For our emulation experiments, we used Mininet [30] and Open vSwitch (OVS) [31]. Table
8.2 summarises the relevant software tools we used in the experiments of this chapter. All
experiments were run on a Dell server (PowerEdge R320 with a 12-core Xeon E5-2400 CPU
and 32GB of RAM), running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with kernel version 3.16.0.
For our hardware test-bed experiments, we used two Dell R320 servers, with specifications
as mentioned above, one as host h1 and the second one as the OVS switch S1. We further
used 2 Dell laptops with an Intel 2.6GHz dual-core CPU and 4GB of RAM, one as the SDN
controller running Ryu and the other one as host h2. With these nodes, we configured the
scenario shown in Figure 6.2.
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Table 6.1: Software Tools used for Implementation and Experiments in Chapter 6
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.2.2
Open vSwitch [31] Software SDN Switch 2.5.2
Ryu [34] SDN Controller Platform 3.19
PackETH [40] Packet Generator 1.8.1
Stress-ng [42] Control Traffic Tool 0.02.26
S1
SDN
Controller
P1
h1 h2
P1 P1
P2
10.0.0.1
00:00:00:00:00:01
10.0.0.2
00:00:00:00:00:02
Figure 6.2: Basic Experiment Scenario
6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we first consider the improvement in the ARP response time that SProxy
ARP achieves compared to the traditional Proxy ARP approach in SDN. We also look at
the reduction in controller overhead of SProxy compared to Proxy ARP, with different ARP
request sending rates.
To achieve this goal, we performed a number of experimental evaluations of SProxy ARP.
For these experiments, we installed OpenFlow rules for all values of TPA that we used in our
experiments, which made sure that all ARP requests can be answered by the switch. This
represents a best-case scenario.
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6.5.1 ARP Response Time
In this experiment, we measured the ARP response time δ at host h1 by taking the difference
δ = t2 − t1 between the time t1 when the ARP request is sent and the time t2 when the
corresponding ARP reply is received at the host.
Figure 6.3 shows the results for both Proxy ARP and SProxy ARP, from both our hardware
test-bed as well as Mininet. The figure shows the average over ten individual measurements,
with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. As expected, we see a significant reduction
in the ARP response time achieved by SProxy ARP, from 3.25ms to 0.18ms on the real test-
bed, and from 2.28ms to 0.14ms in Mininet. This is achieved by avoiding the extra round
trip time to the controller, and the necessary parsing of OpenFlow Packet-In and Packet-Out
messages. The lower value of ARP response time of Proxy ARP in Mininet compared to the
hardware test-bed can be explained by the fact that the control channel over which OpenFlow
Packet-In and Packet-Out messages are sent is faster since it is done via an emulated link
rather than a physical link.
In the above experiment, the controller was idle and did not perform any other functionality.
This is a somewhat unrealistic assumption, since in a real network, the controller would
typically be busy, e.g. handling table-miss events and installing new forwarding rules on
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switches. We therefore want to investigate how the ARP response time is affected by various
levels of background load on the controller. We used the Stress-ng tool [42] to create various
levels of control traffic and hence CPU load.
Figure 6.4 shows the ARP response time for Proxy ARP as well as SProxy ARP, measured
in both Mininet and the hardware test-bed. The x-axis shows the increasing controller CPU
background load generated by the Stress-ng tool. The figure shows the average over ten
measurements, with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
We see that an increased controller background load results in an increased ARP response
time for Proxy ARP, as expected. For a controller load of 100%, the ARP response time is
double the amount as for the idle controller case. The increase is approximately linear for
both the Mininet and hardware test-bed case, reaching more than double the ARP response
time for a maximum controller load compared to the case of an idle controller.
Also as expected, the ARP response time for SProxy ARP is constant and independent
of the controller load since ARP requests are handled by the switch without any controller
involvement. In fact, the SProxy ARP figures are almost identical for both Mininet and the
hardware test-bed, and we, therefore, do not differentiate between the two.
We observe that in the case of 100% controller load, SProxy ARP reduces the ARP response
time by a factor of more than 36 (hardware test-bed), compared to traditional Proxy ARP.
6.5.2 Controller Overhead
Here, we consider the computational overhead placed on the SDN controller by the tradi-
tional Proxy ARP handling approach. The controller CPU load is caused by the parsing of
ARP request packets encapsulated in OpenFlow Packet-In messages, looking up the MAC
address corresponding to the TPA, and creating and sending the ARP reply message encap-
sulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message to the switch. That gives us an indication of
the potential controller load reduction of SProxy ARP, which in the ideal case places virtually
no load on the controller.
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Figure 6.4: ARP Response Time vs. Background Controller CPU Load
Figure 6.5 shows the controller CPU load caused by ARP handling via Proxy ARP, for differ-
ent ARP request sending rates, ranging from 200/s up to 1600/s. As before, the figure shows
the average over 10 experiment runs, with 95% confidence intervals. As expected, we see
a linear increase in the controller CPU load with an increased ARP request sending rate for
Proxy ARP in both scenario, Mininet and the hardware test-bed. While the absolute CPU
load values depend on the specific controller hardware, we see that Proxy ARP handling
can create a significant CPU load. This has a negative impact on network scalability and the
ability of the SDN controller to react timely to other important network events, e.g. table-miss
events.3 In contrast to Proxy ARP, we see that SProxy ARP creates no controller load in this
scenario, as expected.
In addition to the CPU load imposed on the controller by Proxy ARP, we also considered
its overhead in terms of ongoing control traffic between switches and the controller.4 Figure
6.6 shows the amount of control traffic as a function of the ARP request sending rate, for
the same scenario as used in Figure 6.5. As expected, we again see a linear increase in the
control traffic overhead for Proxy ARP and a constant value of 0 for SProxy ARP.
3While an ARP request sending rate of 1600/s is arguably very high, our own measurements of networks
at the University of Mjamaah and the University of Queensland have shown ARP rates of several hundred per
second.
4We ignore traffic required for the initial installation of rules, since this is a one-off cost, compared to contin-
uous traffic overhead of Proxy ARP.
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Figure 6.5: CPU Consumption with Sending Rate
In summary, we can conclude that SProxy ARP achieves a number of key improvements
over traditional Proxy ARP handling in SDN. It achieves a better than the order of magnitude
reduction in the ARP response time, while also significantly reducing the overhead on the
controller, both in terms of CPU load as well as in regards to the control traffic. Reducing
controller load, which makes the network roust against DoS attacks, is a critical issue for
network scalability in SDN.
However, so far we have assumed that all ARP requests are handled by the switch, and
consequently a rule for each requested IP-MAC address mapping is installed on the relevant
switch. This is a somewhat idealistic assumption. While memory in software switches such
as OVSmight not be such a limiting factor, TCAMmemory in hardware OpenFlow switches is
certainly a limited and expensive resource. The following section explores the corresponding
memory-performance trade-off in SProxy ARP.
6.6 Switch Memory-Performance Trade-off
In this section, we discuss the trade-off between the number of rules installed and required
switch memory, versus the possible performance and efficiency gain. To investigate the
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Figure 6.7: ARP Request Distribution based on TPA
memory-performance trade-off of SProxy ARP, we collected a 33-hour trace of ARP traffic
from a core switch at the School of ITEE at the University of Queensland.
Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of ARP requests based on the TPA. We see a power-law-
like distribution, a small number of IP addresses (TPAs) with a high number of ARP requests,
and a long tail of addresses with a small number of requests each.
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Table 6.2: Memory Performance Trade-off
Number of Rules(n) Fraction of ARP Requests Covered
10 22.7%
20 31.4%
30 37.8%
40 42.5%
50 45.5%
60 48.1%
70 50.2%
80 51.9%
90 53.2%
100 54.2%
200 62.4%
300 68.2%
400 72.8%
500 76.5%
600 80.1%
700 83.2%
800 86.0%
900 88.8%
1000 91.4%
This seems to indicate that by installing a relatively small number of switch rules for SProxy
ARP handling, a significant proportion of ARP traffic can be handled at the switch, and hence
a significant performance gain can be achieved at a limited memory cost.
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of ARP requests that can be handled at the switch by
installing rules for the n most requested IP addresses, for different values of n. We see
that by installing rules for the n = 50 most common IP addresses, more than 46% of all
ARP request can be offloaded to the switch, and therefore more than 46% of the associated
performance gains and controller load reduction can be achieved. For n = 100, we can
cover more than 50% of all ARP requests. As can be seen in Figure 6.7, the marginal gain
of installing additional rules is very low for n approaching 100 and below. We have collected
further ARP traces from other networks, and the qualitative property of the distribution with
a small number of high demand IP addresses and a long tail of rarely requested addresses
has been consistent.
The optimal value of n and the corresponding memory-performance trade-off for SProxy
ARP depend on the specifics of the network scenario, e.g. if we are dealing with software
or hardware switches, with more constrained TCAM memory. A detailed evaluation of this is
92
Chapter 6: Efficient Address Resolution Protocol Handling
beyond the scope of this thesis and represents future work.
6.7 Related Works
There have been a number of works that address the issue of controller load and scalability.
Some of these address the problem by distributing the control plane functionality across mul-
tiple physical nodes, such as [78] and [156]. Kandoo [157] proposes a hierarchical controller
architecture with two layers of controllers, one responsible for local control applications, deal-
ing with frequent, low-level events. The other control layer is responsible for managing global
aspects of the network.
More directly related to our work are [158] and [159]. Both papers consider the offloading
of control plane functionality to the data plane (switches), and both papers discuss ARP
handling as an example. However, the approach taken in these papers is fundamentally
different to SProxy ARP. Both [158] and [159] require a significant modification to switches,
and the offloading is achieved by additional software agents placed on the SDN switches.
In contrast, our approach (SProxy ARP), is fully OpenFlow standard compliant and can be
easily implemented in any controller and switch that supports OpenFlow version 1.3 and
higher.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented SProxy ARP, a new approach to handling ARP traffic in SDN.
Through offloading the ARP functionality from the SDN controller to the switches, we have
demonstrated that SProxy ARP can achieve greater than the order of magnitude reduction
in the ARP response time. In addition, our approach significantly reduces the controller
overhead, thereby increasing network scalability and robustness, which are paramount to
enhance security in SDN.
We have demonstrated how offloading the control plane functionality to the data plane is
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achieved without requiring any modifications to the switch. SProxy ARP is completely Open-
Flow standard compliant, which makes it a highly practical and easy to deploy in a production
network. While the discussions in this chapter have focussed on ARP and hence IPv4, the
proposed mechanism can be directly applied to IPv6 to provide the corresponding layer 3
to layer 2 address mapping via NDP (NS/NA), since the relevant protocol match fields are
supported in OpenFlow. The implementation of SProxy ARP for IPv6, as well as for other
SDN controller platforms, represents ongoing and future work.
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Evaluation of Denial of Service Attacks
7.1 Introduction
The SDN architecture provides a different Denial of Service (DoS) attack surface compared
to traditional networks. In particular, the centralised controller represents an attractive target
for DoS attacks. By bringing down the controller, an attacker can bring down, or at least
significantly disrupt, the entire network.
DoS attacks are a significant problem in traditional networks, with an estimated annual cost
of $113 billion globally [26]. With rapidly increasing deployment, it can be expected that
SDNs will become the target of significant DoS attacks. It is therefore critical to investigate
and understand the threats and the potential impact of these attacks. Towards this goal,
this chapter presents an experimental evaluation of the impact of DoS attacks on SDN. We
consider two types of DoS attacks, attacks against the control plane (SDN controller), as well
as attacks against the data plane (switches). In both attacks, the attacker aims to exhaust
the resources of the target. In the case of the control plane attack, this results in the inability
of the controller to handle new flows and to install new forwarding rules reactively. In the
attack against the data plane, we consider two different aims of an attacker, exhaustion of
memory to store forwarding rules, as well as exhaustion of computing resources required to
perform the packet forwarding. Since the memory exhaustion attack has been well studied in
the literature [68, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164], we focus on the attack on the CPU resources of
software SDN switches. This is relevant since software SDN switches running on commodity
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x86 hardware are increasingly widely deployed.
In our experiments, we quantify the impact of these attacks on the ability of the SDN con-
troller to handle regular network traffic, under varying attack rates. We perform our exper-
iments for the following key SDN controller platforms, Ryu [34], ONOS [35] and Floodlight
[36]. To the best of our knowledge, such as comparison has not been presented before.
Another contribution of this chapter is a discussion and investigation of the amplification
effect of DoS attacks against the control plane, where the impact of the attack increases
with the network size, i.e. the number of switches.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 provides some basic back-
ground on SDN packet forwarding. Section 7.4 presents and discusses the results of our
experiments. Section 7.5 gives an overview of key related works, and Section 8.8 concludes
the chapter.
7.2 SDN Packet Forwarding
The OpenFlow protocol allows the controller to install forwarding rules on the switches via
flow-mod messages. These rules follow a simple match-action paradigm, where the match
part can consist of layer 2-4 packet header fields (supporting wild-cards), plus other param-
eters, such as the ingress port. Rules can be installed in a proactive or reactive approach. In
the proactive approach, forwarding rules are pre-installed, prior to the arrival of any packets.
In the reactive approach, which is more common, forwarding rules are installed on-demand.
When a packet arrives at a switch, and there is no matching rule (a table-miss event), the
packet is sent to the controller via an OpenFlow Packet-In message. The controller then
sends the packet back to the switch in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message, with instructions
on how to forward the packet. The controller also installs a set of corresponding forward-
ing rules on switches along the path, to handle any subsequent packets belonging to the
new flow [2, 50]. A table-miss event and the corresponding OpenFlow messages are rela-
tively expensive operations for a controller. As we will see later, this can be exploited by an
attacker.
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The exact behaviour of the controller in regards to handling flows is determined by the for-
warding application running in the controller. Common SDN reactive forwarding applications
supported by most controller platforms include a L2 learning switch and L3 shortest path
routing. For our experiments, we use the default reactive forwarding application of the con-
trollers we are considering, as discussed later.
7.3 DoS Attacks against SDN
As mentioned before, we consider two types of attacks in this chapter. The first attack aims
to exhaust the resources of the SDN controller, while the second attack aims to exhaust the
computing resources of a software switch, i.e. the data plane. In the following, we describe
these attacks in more detail, based on a simple example scenario.
7.3.1 Attack on the Control Plane
We consider the example network topology shown in Figure 7.1, with three hosts attached
to a single OpenFlow switch, which is in turn connected to a controller. The IP and MAC
addresses of the hosts are as indicated.
Here, host h1 is the attacker, whose aim is to create a maximum workload for the controller.
This is achieved by creating a table-miss event for every single packet, resulting in the packet
being sent to the controller in an OpenFlow Packet-In message, and taking up the controller
computing resources in the process. In order to achieve this, the attacker spoofs the source
IP and MAC addresses of the packets, by choosing the addresses uniformly randomly for
each individual packet.1 The destination IP and MAC addresses are also chosen randomly.
In our example, we assume that the controller runs a learning switch forwarding application,
which is the default in most SDN controller platforms. Below is a step-by-step account of
what happens during the attack.
1Choosing different source addresses for every packet makes simple countermeasures implemented by
common controller platforms ineffective.
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Figure 7.1: Basic Attack Scenario
1. The attacker h1 crafts an IP packet (UDP or TCP), with randomly chosen source and
destination IP and MAC addresses, and sends the packet to the switch, where it is
received via port P1. Due to the randomly chosen addresses, there is no matching
rule installed in the switch, which causes the packet to be sent to the controller.
2. The controller sends the packet back to the switch via an OpenFlow Packet-Out mes-
sage, with an action which instructs the switch to flood the packet, i.e. send it out on
all ports except the ingress port.2
3. The switch now sends the packet out on ports P2 and P3, reaching hosts h2 and h3,
neither of which is the destination.3 As a result, no response to the packet is sent,
which also means no flow rule is installed in the switch.
By increasing the attack packet sending rate, the attacker can consume an increasing
amount of controller resources, up to the point where it becomes unable to handle legiti-
mate flows.
2SDN learning switches only install a forwarding rule once it has observed packets in both directions of the
flow.
3With negligible probability.
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7.3.2 Attack on the Data Plane
A widely discussed attack on the SDN data plane is via exhaustion of the TCAM memory in
hardware SDN switches [165, 166]. In contrast, we consider the exhausting of computing re-
sources in a software SDN switch and the resulting impact on its ability to forward legitimate
packets.
In order to consider this kind of attack, we need to slightly change our scenario. Here, we
only want to consider the impact of the attack on the switch’s ability to forward packets,
independently of the controller. We, therefore, assume that the relevant forwarding rules
to handle legitimate traffic are pre-installed on the switch. This means these packets can
be forwarded by the switch, independently of the controller, and we can isolate the attack’s
impact on the switch.
Attack packets are created by host h1 in the same way as in the control plane attack sce-
nario. As a result, the switch sends each attack packet to the controller, encapsulated in an
OpenFlow Packet-In message. Sending this OpenFlow Packet-In message and receiving
and processing the corresponding OpenFlow Packet-Out message from the controller also
take significant computing resources at the switch. In a software switch, the available com-
puting resources are shared between the packet forwarding and the processing of OpenFlow
control messages. Therefore, the attack can result in the disruption of the forwarding capa-
bility of the switch. In the following section, we discuss our experiments in which we quantify
the impact of these attacks, considering three different SDN controllers.
7.4 Experimental Evaluation
7.4.1 Testbed
For our experiments, we used Mininet [30] and OpenvSwitch (OVS) [31]. The controllers
evaluated include three modern SDN controllers, i.e. Ryu [34], ONOS [35], and Flood-
light [36]. We used the default forwarding applications in these controllers, which are sim-
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Table 7.1: Software Tools used for Implementation Experiments in Chapter 7
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.2.2
Open vSwitch [31] Software SDN Switch 2.5.2
OFELIA [32] Hardware SDN Test-bed =======
Ryu [34] SDN Controller Platform 3.22
ONOS [35] SDN Controller Platform 1.10.0
Floodlight [36] SDN Controller Platform 1.0
Scapy Library [38] Packet Manipulation Tool 2.2.0
Tcpreplay [41] Traffic Replay Tool 4.2.6
ple_switch_13 in Ryu, fwd in ONOS and forwarding in Floodlight.
Initially, we used the Scapy library [38] to craft and send the attack packets. However,
the maximum packet sending rate in this approach was limited to around 500 pkts/s. We,
therefore, used an alternative approach where we created a pcap file with attack traffic prior
to the experiment, and then used Tcpreplay [41] to inject the packets into the network at the
desired rate. With this approach, we were able to achieve a packet sending rate of well above
70,000 pkts/s. Table 8.2 summarises the relevant software tools we used in the experiments
of this chapter. All our experiments were carried out on a Dell server (PowerEdge R320 with
a 12-core Xeon E5-2400 CPU and 32GB of RAM), running Ubuntu Linux 17.04 with kernel
version 3.16.0. Each process (ovs-switch, controller, packet injection) was allocated to a
dedicated CPU core to avoid any interference.
7.4.2 Control Plane Attack
In our first experiment, we want to measure the impact of a DoS attack on the controller’s
ability to handle legitimate traffic. For this, we consider the scenario shown in Figure 7.1.
We run ping between hosts h2 and h3, at a rate of 10 ICMP Echo requests per second
and measure the packet delivery ratio (PDR). We slightly modified the controller behaviour
to avoid the installation of forwarding rules for the ping traffic. This forces the ping packets
to be sent to the controller via OpenFlow Packet-In messages and requires the controller’s
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Figure 7.2: Control Plane Attack, PDR
involvement in order to forward the packets. We can, therefore, measure the impact of the
DoS attack on the controller via the PDR of the ping packets, for a range of attack sending
rates.
Figure 7.2 shows the PDR of network traffic between hosts h2 and h3 with different attack
sending rate, ranging from 1000 pkts/s up to 10,000 pkts/s for the three considered con-
trollers. We see that from the attack sending rate of around 7000 pkts/s, all the controllers
are essentially overwhelmed with handling OpenFlow Packet-In and Packet-Out messages
caused by attack traffic. As a result, they are unable to handle any legitimate traffic, and
the PDR drops close to 0%. However, we see a significant difference between the three
controllers.
The PDR for ONOS drops relatively sharply, starting from the attack sending rate of only
2000 pkts/s. Ryu performs slightly better, with the PDR drop starting from 3000 pkts/s.
Floodlight appears to be the most resilient controller, with the ability to handle a much higher
attack sending rate before it completely loses the ability to handle traffic.
We also measured the CPU load of the SDN controllers for the same range of the attack
sending rates. Figure 7.3 shows the result. For all the controllers, we see a near-linear
increase in the CPU load as a function of the attack packet rate. All controllers reach close
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to 100% for the attack sending rate of 10,000 pkts/s.
While there is a clear correlation between the CPU load and the PDR drop, we see that the
CPU load by itself does not completely explain the drop in the PDR. In particular for ONOS,
we see that the PDR drops well before the CPU load reaches 100%. We believe this is due
to differences in the implementation of OpenFlow message handling among the controllers.
So far, we have only considered the simple network topology with a single switch, as shown
in Figure 7.1. We now consider a larger topology in order to explore the effect of the network
size on the impact of the DoS attacks. For the next experiment, we consider a linear topology
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Figure 7.5: Attack Amplification Effect on PDR
with 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 switches. The example with ten switches is shown in Figure 7.4. As
before, the attacker h1 injects UDP packets with random IP and MAC addresses at various
attack sending rates, and we measure the impact of the attack via the PDR of legitimate
traffic sent between hosts h2 and h3. We are interested in how the network size, i.e. number
of switches, affects the impact of the DoS attack.
Figure 7.5 shows the PDR results for the attack sending rates of 1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000
pkts/s on linear topologies of size 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 switches. We reversed the order on the
axis showing the number of switches to increase legibility.
We see that for all controller platforms, an increasing number of switches results in a more
significant drop in the PDR, which corresponds to a substantial impact of the attack. We
refer to this as the attack amplification effect.
As expected, in the case of reactive forwarding applications, each attack packet causes a
pair of OpenFlow Packet-In and Packet-Out messages from each switch to be handled by
the controller. For example, in the case of a learning switch forwarding application, if host h1
sends an attack packet, it will cause a table-miss event at switch S1, with the packet being
sent to the controller as an OpenFlow Packet-Inmessage. Since the controller does not have
sufficient information to install any flow rules at this stage, it will send it back to the switch
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Figure 7.6: Attack Amplification Effect on Controller CPU Load
in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message, with instructions to flood it. As a result, the packet is
sent to switch S2, where it again causes a table-miss event, with another OpenFlow Packet-
In and Packet-Out message, and so forth. As we can see in the graph, the relationship
between the network size and the PDR is roughly linear. We also observe differences in
the attack impact between the three SDN controller platforms, which is consistent with our
previous experiment for the basic topology. We see that ONOS suffers from the most notable
impact of the attack, followed by Ryu and Floodlight.
As for the previous experiment, we also measured the controller CPU load, as shown in
Figure 7.6.4 As expected, we observe an increased controller CPU load for larger networks,
for the same attack sending rate. In summary, we can say that the larger the network, the
easier it is for an attacker to launch a successful attack on the controller, due to the attack
amplification effect. This is in stark contrast to traditional networks, where the control plane
is distributed.
4Note reverse order on the axis showing the number of switches.
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Figure 7.7: Data Plane Attack, PDR
7.4.3 Data Plane Attack
As mentioned before, the aim is to explore the impact of DoS attacks on the data plane.
We particularly consider an attack that tries to exhaust the CPU resources of software SDN
switches, where the computing resources are shared between both the handling of Open-
Flow control messages as well as the forwarding of data packets. We are investigating what
extent an attack, which overwhelms the switch with control message processing, can disrupt
the switch’s packet forwarding capability.
For this experiment, we used the basic scenario in Figure 7.1, with the same assumption that
the attack packets are injected by host h1. Again, we measured the PDR of ping packets
exchanged between hosts h2 and h3. Here, in contrast to the attack on the control plane,
we allow permanent forwarding rules for packets between hosts h2 and h3 to be installed
proactively on the switch. This means that the controller is not involved in the forwarding
of these packets, and any drop in the PDR can be directly attributed to the switch, i.e. the
impact of the DoS attack on the switch.
Figure 7.7 shows the PDR values for the three SDN controller platforms, for different attack
packet sending rates. We again performed the experiment for the three different controllers,
ONOS, Ryu and Floodlight. These might seem strange, since we are attacking the switch,
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and are not concerned about the controller in this experiment. However, we noticed that
each controller reacts differently to the OpenFlow Packet-In messages sent by the switch.
In particular, their rate of sending the corresponding OpenFlow Packet-Out messages back
to the switch can vary significantly, which in turn results in varying loads on the switch.
We observe that for the attack to result in a close to 0% PDR for all controllers, an attack
rate of more than 65,000 pkts/s is required. This is significantly higher than in the control
plane attack scenario. A possible explanation for this is that OVS, which is written in C and
implemented in the Linux kernel, is more efficient in handling OpenFlow control messages,
compared to the controllers.
We also see that for the ONOS controller, a higher attack rate is needed to achieve the
same PDR drop, compared to the other two controllers, Ryu and Floodlight. This does not
necessarily show that the ONOS controller platform is better in that regard. The ONOS
controller simply causes a lower load on the switch, due to its reduced rate of sending
OpenFlow Packet-Out messages, and hence reduces the impact of the DoS attack on the
switch. This is the result of a rate control mechanism that ONOS implements. In contrast,
both Ryu and Floodlight have a higher rate of OpenFlow Packet-Out messages, and hence
cause a higher load on the switch, resulting in a considerable PDR drop for lower attack
rates.
We also measured the switch CPU load during the experiment, and the result is shown in
Figure 7.8. As expected, we see an increase in the switch CPU load with an increasing attack
sending rate.5 Consistent with the results in Figure 7.7, we see that the load is smallest for
the ONOS controller, due to its reduced rate of OpenFlow Packet_Out messages. As for
the PDR results, the Ryu and Floodlight controllers behave similarly. We observe a clear
correlation between the switch CPU load and the PDR drop of ping packets. It is interesting
to note that a significant disruption of the switch’s ability to forward packets, as measured
via the PDR, starts to happen well before the switch CPU is fully saturated.
5To be more precise, this refers to a CPU core. As mentioned, before, OVS is allocated a dedicated CPU
core, so that we can isolate the CPU load.
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Figure 7.8: Data Plane Attack, CPU Load
7.5 Related Works
There are a number of papers that have considered the problem of DoS attacks in the context
of SDN. This section provides a brief overview of key related works.
The authors of [105] propose a lightweight method to detect distributed DoS attacks against
the control plane, based on an entropy-based anomaly detection approach. The entropy
is calculated from destination IP addresses of incoming packets, and a simple threshold is
used to detect an attack, i.e. an attack is detected if the entropy falls below the defined
threshold. The proposed approach is not able to detect the attack proposed in this chapter,
due to the fact that network traffic generated in our approach has maximum entropy since IP
addresses are uniformly generated for each packet. Despite the title, which indicates DoS
attacks against SDN controllers are considered, the main focus of the paper is on attacks
against end-hosts in the context of SDN.
The paper [165] discusses DoS attacks in SDN, considering the exhaustion of control chan-
nel bandwidth as well as switch memory, which are both different from the DoS attacks
considered in our work. The paper proposes mitigation strategies based on rate limiting as
well as choosing optimal time-out values of flow rules.
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FloodGuard [167] is a defence mechanism designed to protect the SDN controller from
DoS attacks, in particular it aims to prevent resource exhaustion attacks against the switch-
controller control channel. This is in contrast to our work, which specifically considers the
attack on the computing resources of the SDN controller and switches. The paper further
proposes a mitigation approach based on rate limiting control messages.
Similarly, [168] also consider DoS attacks against the SDN control channel. The authors
introduce LineSwitch, which is a mitigation approach based probabilistic proxying and black-
listing. To implement this, a special proxy module needs to be installed on edge switches.
A potential hurdle to adoption is the fact that the approach requires a modification to the
OpenFlow standard in order to be implemented. The paper does not provide a quantitative
evaluation of the attack impact for different SDN controller platforms.
In [98], the authors present AVANT-GUARD, an OpenFlow switch extension with the aim
to mitigate against DoS attacks in SDN. The basic idea is similar to LineSwitch. A key
component in AVANT-GUARD is the connection migration module, which adds intelligence
to the data plane to differentiate source nodes who likely complete the TCP connections
from the ones who perform a TCP SYN flooding attack. The mechanism is implemented via
a TCP proxy functionality deployed on the OpenFlow switches. The paper does not address
the kind of simple volumetric DoS attacks that are discussed and demonstrated, and neither
does it provide an experimental comparison of the attack impact for different SDN controller
platforms.
In summary, there are a lot of related works on DoS attacks in SDN, proposing a number of
attack detection and mitigation mechanisms. However, none of the works have presented
a detailed experimental evaluation on the quantitative impact of DoS attacks against the
computing resources of the SDN control plane and data plane. To the best of our knowledge,
no paper has presented a detailed comparison of the impact of DoS attacks for the three
SDN controller platforms considered in this chapter.
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7.6 Conclusions
DoS attacks are a critical problem in traditional networks and are likely to become an even
bigger one in SDN, due to the centralisation of network control functionality at the controller.
It is therefore important to understand the types of DoS attacks that are possible against the
SDN infrastructure and to have an understanding of the quantitative impact of the attacks. In
this chapter, we presented detailed experimental evaluations of DoS attacks against SDN.
We considered attacks against the control plane (SDN controller) as well as attacks against
the data plane (switches). For the latter case, we considered an attack scenario that has not
been well studied so far, i.e. an attack that aims to exhaust the computing resources of an
OpenFlow-based software switch.
A key novel contribution of our work is the comparison of the impact of the DoS attacks for
three different SDN controller platforms, i.e. Ryu, ONOS and Floodlight. While we found
significantly different results for the different controllers, the overall conclusion is that an at-
tacker controlling a single host can completely disrupt the forwarding capability of a network
with relatively limited resources. We also discussed the attack amplification effect, which
results in a roughly linear increase in the attack impact with an increase in the network size.
This is an important consideration, especially for large-scale SDNs. It is also a major dif-
ference to traditional networks with a distributed control plane. We believe that our findings
provide further insights into the problem of DoS attacks against SDNs, and can hopefully be
used to inform the development of DoS mitigation mechanisms and countermeasures.
109
Chapter 8
Security of Virtualisation
8.1 Introduction
Network virtualisation (NV) is a key functionality enabled by SDN. NV allows multiple entities
(tenants) to have their own individual virtual network, based on a shared physical network
infrastructure. In the context of SDN, this means that multiple SDN controllers can run
concurrently, each controlling its own dedicated and isolated virtual network. This approach
essentially hides the underlying network complexity and the characteristics of the forwarding
elements by subdividing or slicing the physical network into multiple virtual networks. It
provides an abstraction layer that allows multiple logical networks to run simultaneously on
the same physical infrastructure [169, 170, 171].
The main drivers behind the growth of NV include cost-effectiveness, network deployment
speed and flexibility. Thus, users are free to efficiently and dynamically aggregate net-
work resources and request different network services from the same underlying physical
infrastructure without interfering with each other and worrying about the characteristics of
underlying hardware infrastructure.
A key requirement of NV in regards to security is the maintenance of isolation of the different
virtual networks. An attacker on one virtual network should not be able to bypass the virtual-
isation layer (hypervisor), and interact with and possibly disrupt nodes or controllers on other
virtual networks. This is similar to the corresponding requirement in compute virtualisation
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[172], which has been widely studied.
This chapter aims to provide an initial exploration of network virtualisation security in SDN
that has received very limited or no attention. In particular, we consider FlowVisor [27] and
OpenVirteX (OVX) [28], the two most relevant SDN hypervisor platforms commonly deployed
in network test-beds, e.g. OFELIA [32], GENI [118], FITS [173], etc. OVX is an integrated
component of the widely used ONOS SDN controller platform. We consider these network
hypervisors together with key SDN controller platforms such as Ryu [34], ONOS [35] and
Floodlight [36].
Our exploration identifies a number of significant security vulnerabilities in the current imple-
mentation of SDN hypervisors, which are either due to design flaws or implementation bugs.
A further contribution is the practical demonstration of the feasibility of the attacks, and an
evaluation of their potential impact.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 provides a brief overview on the current
state-of-the-art of network virtualisation mechanisms in SDN. Section 8.3 presents a classi-
fication of security threats towards network virtualisation in SDN, and Section 8.4 discusses
related works. Section 8.5 briefly presents our experimental platform. Section 8.6 and Sec-
tion 8.7 describe the vulnerability of the current SDN hypervisors, i.e. FlowVisor and Open-
Virtex respectively, and demonstrate a number of potential attacks. Section 8.8 concludes
the chapter.
8.2 SDN Hypervisor Platforms
8.2.1 FlowVisor
The first OpenFlow-based hypervisor platform that provides virtualisation for SDN is FlowVi-
sor [27], which uses a typical multi-tenancy technique that enables multiple SDN controllers
to share the hardware resources of a particular physical infrastructure. FlowVisor allows vir-
tualisation of bandwidth, topology, traffic, device CPU and forwarding tables, with no modifi-
cation applied to the control plane and the data plane. It acts as a proxy between forwarding
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Figure 8.1: FlowVisor Architecture
elements and controllers and is, therefore, able to inspect and rewrite all OpenFlow mes-
sages sent between the control plane and the data plane. In this way, it can enforce isolation
of the different network slices and can make sure that packets stay within their configured
virtual networks. The key virtualisation mechanism in FlowVisor works via the slicing of the
flow space, which is made up of the OpenFlow packet header bits. Therefore, slicing can be
done based on IP addresses, MAC addresses, VLAN tags, etc.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the general FlowVisor architecture. The bottom layer, i.e. Slicing Poli-
cies, allocates a fraction of link bandwidth, network topology and number of forwarding en-
tries per slice, and ensures no slice monopolises the entire hardware resources. The layer
also determines where to forward a packet based on a set of flow rules, i.e. flow space. At
the top of the FlowVisor architecture is the logic abstraction layer, which presents a logical
copy of routers and switches, i.e. a virtually sliced networks to each of the different ten-
ant controllers, configured individually based on information provided by the Slicing Policies
layer.
Upon receiving an OpenFlow message from an SDN controller, FlowVisor parses the packet
header and makes a policy check to decide which slice is the message belongs to. In this
process, FlowVisor also verifies that the flow definition of the message is within the allocated
flow space of the sender tenant. Packets are generally rewritten and forwarded to adhere the
slice policy. For example, if slicing is done using VLAN tags, a packet sent from a controller
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will be modified, and the corresponding VLAN tag will be set. One of the limitations of
OpenFlow is that it only supports network slices with disjoint flow spaces.
8.2.2 OpenVirteX
OpenVirteX (OVX) [28] is a network hypervisor that takes virtualisation in SDN a step further.
Similar to FlowVisor, it acts as a transparent proxy between OpenFlow switches and SDN
controllers. The key improvement of OVX over FlowVisor is that it supports full flow space
virtualisation, which means it supports multiple slices with overlapping flow spaces, e.g. IP
and MAC address range, VLAN ID, etc.
OVX assigns each virtual network a global unique identifier, i.e. an ID (tenant ID) for each
tenant. Instead of allocating packets based on flow space matching, the key limitation of
FlowVisor, OVX places a new functionality at SDN edge switches, that explicitly rewrites the
header fields on incoming packets into its own, unique format. This rewriting is reversed
when packets are sent to the respective destination slices, i.e. hosts or controller.
The OVX architecture consists of two logical layers, OVX virtual networks and OVX physical
networks, as shown in Figure 8.2. The OVX virtual networks layer provides tenants with a
completely isolated virtual network, consisting of virtual switches and links. As a result, each
tenant can specify its own, unique virtual network topology. The OVX physical networks
layer provides a network topology, equivalent to the physical infrastructure and maintains
the mapping of OpenFlow messages between OVX and the data plane. The information
that allows this bridging is maintained in the OVXMap, which also records the (tenant IDs)
to track the state of the OVX physical networks (e.g. network topology) and correspondingly
update the OVX virtual networks.
Upon receiving a packet via an OpenFlow message from an SDN controller, OVX parsers the
packet and maps it to the corresponding tenant ID, re-writes the header fields and validates
that isolation is maintained between the different virtual networks. When OVX receives a
message from an SDN switch, it uses the tenant ID to determine the corresponding virtual
network, and therefore how the packet is to be handled [28].
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The key difference between OVX and FlowVisor lies in the flexibility of the topology customi-
sation and addressing scheme, which has implications for traffic isolation. By leveraging
OVX, each tenant is provided with a fully virtualised network and is free to implement the
desirable topology regardless of the physical topology, and choose any addressing scheme
for their hosts, regardless if there is an overlap with other virtual networks. However, in
FlowVisor, tenants are only allowed to specify a topology that is isomorphic to the actual
physical network topology. The entire flow space is essentially sliced into non-overlapping
flow spaces.
In this chapter, we focus on the security of FlowVisor and OVX, since they are the most
relevant and widely used SDN hypervisors. We also briefly discuss other SDN hypervisors
and related proposals in the following section.
8.2.3 Other SDN Hypervisor Platforms
VeRTIGO [174] extends the network slicing techniques of FlowVisor and introduces addi-
tional abstraction features to improve and overcome the FlowVisor’s limitation. With VeR-
TIGO, each SDN controller basically operates on a disjoint subset of network and is provided
with a logical representation of the physical topology. Therefore, the full virtual network that
includes virtual links and nodes is presented to the SDN controller.
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Advanced FlowVisor (ADVisor) [175] is also an extension of FlowVisor that mainly relies on
the tag-based virtualisation to distinguish between tenants. OpenFlow switches are pro-
grammed to add the VLAN ID for traffic entering the network.
Similarly, the FlowN architecture [176] is proposed to improve the tag-based virtualisation.
FlowN is a container-based virtualisation that communicates directly with the tenant con-
troller over a special OpenFlow API, rather than the OpenFlow protocol. Instead of simulta-
neously running multiple SDN controllers, FlowN allows only one SDN controller with multiple
containers to share the kernel space with independent namespaces. Based on the VLAN
ID, FlowN virtualises the physical network infrastructure and allows tenants to specify the
addressing scheme and the network topology. FlowN basically tags traffic entering the net-
work with the VLAN ID and removes the VLAN ID when traffic leaves the network. The key
benefit of FlowN is that the mapping of OpenFlow messages traverse the control channel
between the physical and virtual networks is no longer required, resulting in the reduction of
the memory and computing overhead.
AutoSlice [177] is an SDN virtualisation layer that distributes the functionality of the hypervi-
sor through the segmentation of the physical infrastructure into multiple SDN domains. Each
SDN domain includes a controller proxy to essentially manage OpenFlow messages be-
tween the SDN controller and switches. To optimise network resource utilisation, AutoSlice
dynamically assigns virtual sources to each separate SDN domain.
AutoVFlow [178] is an extension of AutoSlice that grants the tenants of wide-area networks
a full control of their own virtual SDNs. In contrast to AutoSlice, where the flow space
is shared, and controller tenants are restricted to the permissible header values of data
packets, AutoVFlow provides each controller proxy of each SDN domain with the ability
to freely utilise the entire flow space, similar to OpenVirteX, i.e. allowing overlapping flow
spaces.
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8.3 SDN Virtualisation Vulnerabilities
Most security vulnerabilities in software systems arise from either improper design or imple-
mentation bugs, i.e. software flaws, due to the fact that the system designer and the software
programmer are humans and can make mistakes [179]. As a result, attackers can readily
exploit the software bugs and produce unpredictable inputs to passively modify the system
behaviour as desired. Despite the fact that Heartbleed [180], the most impactful security bug
in OpenSSL’s history, was simple and uncomplicated to remediate, the impact was extremely
severe. In general, software flaws are notoriously difficult to discover and are often the root
cause of major system disruptions and outages. Therefore, writing bug-free and reliable
software remains a critical challenge [181]. Due to the ’softwareisation’ of networks in SDN,
the problems of software design and implementation flaws become an increasingly critical
security threat. SDN controllers are complex software systems, with a significant potential
for flaws and bugs.
In virtualised SDN networks, the network hypervisor appears as a controller to the data plane
and as forwarding elements to the control plane, which in this case represents a single point
of failure. By successfully attacking the SDN network hypervisor, an attacker can disrupt or
potentially bring down the entire network, including all virtual networks controlled by different
tenants. This provides a key motivation for the work presented in this chapter.
Table 8.1 provides a brief summary with representative examples of threat categories applied
to the SDN virtualisation layer. It is apparent from the table that the attacker can masquerade
and falsify packets information of other tenants running on a completely separate network
simply after breaking the isolation mechanism. As a result, we believe that applying an ef-
fective and efficient testing mechanism to any SDN controller platforms is crucial and should
be conducted through the software development life cycle. For our security analysis of SDN
hypervisors, we used a combination of code analysis and fuzz testing [29].
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Table 8.1: Classification of Network Virtualisation Threats
Threat categories Definitions
Examples in SDN Virtualisa-
tion
Unauthorised Dis-
closure
An unauthorised user gains ac-
cess to protected information
A malicious tenant intercepts
network traffic that belongs to
other tenants
Deception
An authorised user receives that
data is being altered without the
user’s knowledge
A malicious tenant breaks the
isolation mechanism and mod-
ifies network packets of other
tenants
Disruption
Interrupt the communication and
cause a system failure
A malicious tenant launches De-
nial of Service (DoS) attacks
against other tenants
8.4 Related Works
In this section, we particularly focus on describing the most relevant work on the area of
network virtualisation security in the SDN context. We only found a very limited number of
works, which specifically consider the security of current SDN hypervisor platforms.
The paper [182] briefly mentions potential vulnerabilities in FlowVisor that can violate the
isolation mechanism through the VLAN ID and rewriting fields. The proposed solution is an
independent extension of FlowVisor, which basically limits the number of actions supported
in the OpenFlow protocol. The paper does not provide clear technical details on how the
VLAN ID and rewriting fields can break the isolation mechanism, as provided in this chapter.
The paper also does not discuss or evaluate the impact of those vulnerabilities, nor does it
investigate other vulnerabilities in FlowVisor.
The authors of [183] mention a potential attack against FlowVisor, where it is assumed that
an administrator configures virtual networks with overlapping flow spaces. The 2-page paper
lacks details and does not provide an evaluation of the potential impact of the attack.
Existing work on the security analysis of FlowVisor is very limited. Furthermore, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no previous work on vulnerability assessment of OpenVirteX.
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Table 8.2: Software Tools used for Implementation and Experiments in Chapter 8
Software Function Version
Mininet [30] Network Emulator 2.2.2
Open vSwitch [31] Software SDN Switch 2.6.1
Ryu [34] SDN Controller Platform 3.22
ONOS [35] SDN Controller Platform 1.11.1
Floodlight [36] SDN Controller Platform 1.0
FlowVisor [27] SDN Hypervisor 1.2.0
OpenVirteX [28] SDN Hypervisor branch 0.0-MAINT
Netcat [43] Network Sniffing Tool 5.59BETA1
8.5 Experimental Platform
For all our experiments discussed later in this chapter, we used Mininet [30] and
Open vSwitch (OVS) [31]. The standard network topology used in our experiments con-
sists of three OpenFlow switches with two hosts attached to each switch, as shown in Figure
8.3. Each host is assigned to a different virtual network.
We used FlowVisor and OVX as our SDN hypervisors to provide isolation that allows tenants,
Tenant 1 and Tenant 2 to run two virtual networks in parallel, i.e. Virtual Network 1 and Virtual
Network 2 over the same physical network infrastructure. Each virtual network runs its own
tenant controller.
The SDN controller platforms we considered to run on top of Virtual Network 1, i.e. Tenant
1 are Ryu [34], ONOS [35], and Floodlight [36], with the default forwarding applications,
simple_switch in Ryu, fwd in ONOS and forwarding in Floodlight. We further used Netcat
[43], a network tool for collecting network traffic. Table 8.2 summarises the relevant software
tools we used in the experiments of this chapter.
All our experiments were conducted on a Dell server (PowerEdge R320 with a 12-core Xeon
E5-2400 CPU and 32GB of RAM), running Ubuntu Linux 17.10 with kernel version 3.16.0.
To minimise interference, we allocated each key process (ovs-switch, controllers, FlowVisor,
OVX) to a dedicated CPU core. The following sections present our results and a demonstra-
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tion of the feasibility of attacks using the identified vulnerabilities in FlowVisor and OVX.
8.6 Security of FlowVisor
By analysing the source code of FlowVisor and using fuzz testing, we exposed previously
unknown security vulnerabilities that make the system susceptible to various attacks. In the
following, we discuss these vulnerabilities and demonstrate how they can be exploited.
8.6.1 Topology Discovery
FlowVisor discovers the topology of the physical network infrastructure via utilising the Open-
Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) and builds its own link database based on the information
provided in the corresponding LLDP packets. FlowVisor relies on this database to pro-
vide tenant controllers with the underlying topology. It mainly precludes any SDN controller
running the topology discovery component from directly retrieving the actual topology of
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the physical network itself. For example, when a tenant controller runs topology discovery,
which sends its own LLDP packets, FlowVisor intercepts them, and creates LLDP packets
in response, in order to ’emulate’ the virtual topology that this controller is supposed to see.
The format of the LLDP frame used in FlowVisor is similar to the original LLDP format,
described earlier except that FlowVisor adds a trailer to its own LLDP packets as shown
in Figure 8.4. The trailer consists of two new fields, the first one carries the "FlowVisor"
name and the second one carries the "Slice" name, to distinguish between LLDP packets
generated by FlowVisor and LLDP packets generated by SDN controllers running their own
topology discovery. The basic security problem with the current implementation of OFDP is
that it is fundamentally insecure due to the lack of any authentication and integrity protection
mechanism, as demonstrated previously.
The trailer that FlowVisor adds to the LLDP packets does not add any security mechanism,
and hence any LLDP packet with a trailer is accepted by FlowVisor for processing. The
information provided in the packet is used to update the FlowVisor’s link database. As a
consequence, it is relatively easy for an attacker to inject a fabricated LLDP packet, resulting
in a poisoning of the topology information of the FlowVisor database.
The method of the attack is essentially the same as the one discussed previously in Chapter
4, but the key difference here is that we are attacking the SDN hypervisor, instead of the
SDN controller. As a result, all virtual networks and tenants are impacted by the attack and
are presented with invalid network topology information.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the attack, we used the virtual network test-bed and the net-
work topology described in Section 8.5. For this example scenario, FlowVisor is configured
to slice the network based on the VLAN ID. In this case, we have two virtual networks, Vir-
tual Network 1 with VLAN ID 100, and Virtal Network 2 with VLAN ID 200, and each virtual
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ubuntu@sdnhubvm:~[18:45]$ fvctl list-links 
Password:  
[ 
  { 
    "dstDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01",  
    "dstPort": "2",  
    "srcDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03",  
    "srcPort": "1" 
  },  
  { 
    "dstDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03",  
    "dstPort": "3",  
    "srcDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02",  
    "srcPort": "4" 
  },  
  { 
    "dstDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02",  
    "dstPort": "4",  
    "srcDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03",  
    "srcPort": "3" 
  },  
  { 
    "dstDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02",  
    "dstPort": "3",  
    "srcDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01",  
    "srcPort": "3" 
  },  
  { 
    "dstDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01",  
    "dstPort": "3",  
    "srcDPID": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02",  
    "srcPort": "3" 
  } 
Figure 8.5: FlowVisor Database Attack
network runs its own ONOS SDN controller instance.
For this experiment, we assume that the attack is generated via host h2, which injects an
LLDP packet with the structure shown in Figure 8.4, aiming to fabricate a fake link from
switch S1 on port P2, and switch S3 on port P1.
As mentioned, the attack steps are quite similar to the attack discussed in Chapter 4, except
that we need to include the relevant FlowVisor LLDP trailer, i.e the "magic flowvisor1" and
"fvadmin" fields.
When the packet arrives at switch S1, which adds its own Chassis ID and Port ID, according
to its pre-defined rule, it forwards the packet to the controller, encapsulated in an OpenFlow
Packet-In message. FlowVisor intercepts the packet and updates its links database based
on the information provided in the payload of the received LLDP packet.
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Figure 8.5 shows the FlowVisor link database after launching the attack.1 Each group rep-
resents detailed information, e.g. source and destination of ports and switches of a uni-
directional link. For example, the first line (in bold) indicates that there is a unidirectional
link between switch S3 on port P1 and switch S1 on port P2. Hence, the attack has been
successful, since such a link does not exist in the topology. This is the network information
that FlowVisor will provide to the tenants when they query the underlying topology, resulting
in a poisoning of all controllers’ topology information. The potential impact of this has been
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
8.6.2 Breaking Isolation
Another security problem with the current design of FlowVisor is that there is no detailed
security check implemented to investigate the content of packet sent from a controller to a
switch in the form of an OpenFlow packet. In particular, FlowVisor fails to properly check
the OpenFlow actions (action list) associated with the packet and eventually installed on
switches.
This is a problem, if the action list contains a ’set-filed’ action, which provides direct access to
the header fields of a packet and overwrites specified fields with arbitrary values. Therefore,
it is relatively easy for an attacker to redirect his own traffic to another virtual network. This
is particularly simple if the network is sliced based on the VLAN IDs, which the attacker can
alter by adding a set_VLAN ID action to a match rule.
To experimentally demonstrate this vulnerability, we used the same network scenario as
mentioned above. We assume that the attack comes from Virtal Network 2 (Tenant 2), and
the aim is to break FlowVisor’s isolation and inject network traffic into Virtual Network 1
(Tenant 1).
The attack can be broken down into the following steps:
1. Controller C1 initially installs an OpenFlow rule with a high priority on all switches,
switch S1, switch S2 and switch S3, to match on the VLAN ID of 200, which explicitly
1This is obtained by a FlowVisor command, i.e. fvctl list-links.
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matches all packets sent by any hosts, belonging to its own network, i.e. Virtal Network
2. The corresponding action list associated with this rule has two actions: (1) set
the VLAN ID to 100, and (2) forward the packet to the controller. In this case, all
packets traversing through Virtual Network 2 are redirected to the controller C0 of
Virtual Network 1.
2. The attacker now needs to generate traffic either from a hosts (h2, h4 or h6) or from
the controller C1. For our experiment, we assume that the attack is generated via the
controller, by injecting an ARP packet, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out mes-
sage at different sending rates. The problem with this scenario is that the OpenFlow
rule installed previously to modify the VLAN ID is not executed, and hence the packet
is treated according to the action list associated with this packet. The simple solution
to this is to set the action of the output port to OFPP_TABLE, which allows the switch
to handle the packet as if it was received via any of the switch’s regular ports, and
processes the packet according to the rules in its forwarding table. In this case, we
can ensure that involved switches rewrite the VLAN ID from 200 to 100 and then send
the packet to the controller.
3. FlowVisor receives the packet, and based on the VLAN ID, it forwards the packet to
the switches S1, S2 and S3. Each switch receives a copy of the packet and performs
the actions as specified in the forwarding table, which includes modifying the VLAN
ID from 200 to 100 and sending the packet back to the controller, encapsulated in an
OpenFlow Packet-In message.
4. FlowVisor receives three OpenFlow Packet-In messages and checks the VLAN ID to
know where to forward the packets to, either Virtual Network 1 or Virtual Network 2.
Since the VLAN ID is 100 and FlowVisor is unable to detect the VLAN ID modification,
the packets are forwarded to Virtual Network 1, and hence the attack is successful.
Being able to direct traffic to a controller of a foreign virtual network can be used for DoS
attacks. To quantify the severity of such an attack, we consider the CPU load on the target
controller C0, caused by the processing the DoS packets, i.e. the process of parsing re-
ceived OpenFlow Packet-In messages, generated by the malicious controller C1, as well as
transmitting the corresponding OpenFlow Packet-Out messages.
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Figure 8.6: Controller CPU Load
Figure 8.6 shows the controller CPU load under the attack, depending on the attack sending
rate, ranging from 1000 to 10,000 pkts/s. We repeated the experiment with three SDN
controller platforms, i.e. Ryu, ONOS and Floodlight, and the corresponding CPU load values
are shown in the graph. In addition, the graph also shows the CPU load for FlowVisor. All
experiments were repeated 15 times, and the graph shows the mean value as well as the
95% confidence intervals.
As can be seen in the figure, with an increase in the attack sending rates, the controller CPU
load increases roughly linearly. In this scenario, the attacker is able to saturate the controller
CPU with the rate of 10,000 pkts/s, which can be done with relatively minimal effort. The
attacker can achieve the same impact with a much lower attack rate, by adding multiple
forward actions to the action list of the OpenFlow Packet-Out messages. For example, if
each OpenFlow Packet-Out message contains 100 forward actions, the impact is multiplied
by a factor of 100. This amplification potentially allows attackers with relatively minimal
computing resources and bandwidth to saturate high-powered controllers. As mentioned,
the attack can equally be launched from any of the hosts.
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8.6.3 Ping of Death
Using fuzz testing, we also found that a single malformed message can crash FlowVisor.
We refer to this attack as ’Ping of Death’. The result of this is quite severe since the entire
network is disabled.
For the attack, we create an LLDP packet, with the format shown in Figure 8.4, but sim-
ply without a trailer. For our experimental evaluation of the attack, we used our previous
scenario.
The attack can be generated either from the tenant controller or any of the hosts. For this
experiment, we assume that the attack comes from Virtual Network 2 (Tenant 2), and is
generated via our controller component running as the tenant controller of Virtual Network 2.
The impact of this attack is only on FlowVisor, and there is no need to consider different
SDN controller platforms for Virtual Network 1. In this scenario, we used ONOS as the
tenant controller of Virtual Network 1. The controller C1 injects the attack LLDP packet,
encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message and forwards it to the switch. FlowVisor
intercepts the packet and parses the packet header.
As a result, FlowVisor immediately throws an exception and shuts down, as shown in the
FlowVisor log messages in Figure 8.7. Since FlowVisor represents a single point of failure,
the entire network is taken down as a result, with potentially severe consequences.
We found this vulnerability using fuzz testing with a relatively small effort. It is likely that more
extensive investigation would reveal further bugs and vulnerabilities. Our example highlights
the importance of secure coding practices for critical network infrastructure services such as
hypervisors in SDN.
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CRIT:2017-04-17T22:25:19.549:none:: MAIN THREAD DIED!!! 
CRIT:2017-04-17T22:25:19.552:none:: restarting after main thread died 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.552:TopoDiscovery:: shutting down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.552:topoDpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01:: shutting down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.553:topoDpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03:: shutting down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.553:topoDpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02:: shutting down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.553:TopoDiscovery:: shutting down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.553:classifier dpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01::tearing down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.554:classifier dpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03::tearing down 
WARN:2017-04-17T22:25:19.556:classifier-dpid=00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02::tearing down 
Figure 8.7: FlowVisor Crash, Ping of Death
8.7 Security of OpenVirteX (OVX)
We conducted the same basic approach to analyse the security of OVX as we did for FlowVi-
sor. In the following, we discuss the results.
8.7.1 Topology Discovery
Like FlowVisor, OVX utilises OFDP to discover the underlying topology to build its own topol-
ogy database. By intercepting LLDP packets sent by tenant controllers’ topology discovery
service, and by creating the corresponding responses, OVX let the controllers see any arbi-
trary virtual network topology.
The format of the LLDP packets used in OVX is similar to the format used in FlowVisor, and
in the original LLDP format, with only two additional TLVs, as shown in Figure 8.8.
The first TLV field, OpenNetw1 TLV, carries the OpenVriteX name, while the second one,
OpenNetw2 TLV, carries the Switch ID. Upon receiving an LLDP packet from a switch, OVX
processes the packet and extracts link information, i.e. Switch ID (the value specified in the
OpenNetw2 TLV), and Port ID from the payload of the packet. The link information is stored
in the OVX database.
As mentioned previously, the current implementation of OFDP is insecure, and adding extra
TLVs fields cannot protect topology discovery from the link spoofing attack. The attacker is
still able to craft an LLDP packet that includes two additional TLV fields to deceive OVX to
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Figure 8.8: OpenVirteX LLDP Frame Structure
poison the topology information in the OVX database.
We demonstrated the vulnerability of OVX against the topology poisoning or link fabrication
attack via a simple experiment, via our standard experiment scenario used for FlowVisor.
For this, we created two virtual networks, Virtual Network 1 and Virtual Network 2. Similar to
the FlowVisor case, the impact of this attack does not depend on the controller, and thus we
used ONOS in both virtual networks.
For this experiment, we used the assumption that the attack is launched via host h2, which
belongs Virtual Network 2 controlled by malicious controller C1. The attacker aims to fabri-
cate a fake link from switch S1 on port P2 to switch S3 on port P2. The only difference in
the attack steps to the FlowVisor case is that the OpenNetw1 field included "OpenVirteX "
and the OpenNetw2 field included the sender switch ID, which in this case is the ID of switch
S3. This makes the packet looks like it was sent out on port P2 of switch S3. The packet is
forward to the controller by switch S1, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message
that includes the Chassis ID and the Port ID of switch S1. Upon receiving the packet, OVX
extracts the link information and incorrectly updates its links database.
Figure 8.9 shows the OVX topology database after launching the attack.2 The highlighted
line (in bold), which appears after the attack is performed, indicates the success of the attack,
and there is a physical link from S3, P1 to S1, P2, which is incorrect. As mentioned in the
case of FlowVisor, poisoning the hypervisor topology database will also poison the topology
view of all tenant controllers, potentially resulting in the disruption of network operation and
packet forwarding.
2This is obtained through the OVX command line interface, i.e. the getPhysicalTopology command.
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ubuntu@sdnhubvm:~/OpenVirteX/utils[21:15] (0.0-MAINT)$ python 
ovxctl.py getPhysicalTopology 
Password: 
{"switches": ["00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03", "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01", 
"00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02"], "links": [{"linkId": 3.0, "dst": 
{"port": "3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01"}, "src": {"port": 
"3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02"}}, {"linkId": 2.0, "dst": 
{"port": "4", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02"}, "src": {"port": 
"3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03"}}, {"linkId": 1.0, "dst": 
{"port": "3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03"}, "src": {"port": 
"4", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02"}}, {"linkId": 4.0, "dst": 
{"port": "2", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01"}, "src": {"port": 
"1", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:03"}}, {"linkId": 0.0, "dst": 
{"port": "3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02"}, "src": {"port": 
"3", "dpid": "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01"}}]} 
Figure 8.9: OpenVirteX Database Attack
8.7.2 Breaking Isolation
As discussed in the previous section, OVX’s topology discovery mechanism is vulnerable to
the poisoning attacks, where an attacker can fabricate fake links. Here, we show how this
can be exploited to break the isolation mechanism between two virtual networks. Using this
attack, we can create a fake link between S1, P2 and S3, P1, using our standard scenario.
We use the fact that tenant controllers build their topology database based on the (poisoned)
topology information provided by OVX, thereby including the fake link between S1, P2 and
S3, P1.
While this does not allow us to inject traffic from one network to another, it still allows the
attacker h2 to passively observe traffic from Virtual Network 2, traversing through the fake
link. In order to achieve this, the attacking host h2 simply needs to be disconnected from its
network, and its interface needs to be set to promiscuous mode.
To show the ability to break the isolation and intercept network packets, we established
a TCP connection between hosts h1 and h5, which both belong to Virtual Network 1. In
parallel, we ran Netcat [43] on the attacker h2 that belongs to Virtual Network 2 to collect
network traffic transmitted between hosts hosts h1 and h5. As a result, all packets from host
h1 destined to host h5 pass through host h2, as shown in the first two lines of Figure 8.10.
We also ran ping between the hosts, and the corresponding ICMP packets were also seen
by host h2, as shown in the last 7 lines of the figure.
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23:38:34.554139 IP 10.0.0.1.57246 > 10.0.0.5.1234: Flags [S],seq 
1288162783, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val1336219ecr 
0,nop,wscale 9], length 0 
23:38:35.858258 IP 10.0.0.1.57246 > 10.0.0.5.1234: Flags [S],seq 
1288162783, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val1336721ecr 
0,nop,wscale 9], length 0 
23:38:36.275558  IP 10.0.0.1  >  10.0.0.5: ICMP  echo request,id 
29105, seq 1, length 64 
23:38:37.284092  IP 10.0.0.1  >  10.0.0.5: ICMP  echo request,id 
29105, seq 2, length 64 
23:38:38.292113  IP 10.0.0.1  >  10.0.0.5: ICMP  echo request,id 
29105, seq 3, length 64 
23:38:39.300131  IP  10.0.0.1 >  10.0.0.5: ICMP  echo request,id 
29105, seq 4, length 64 
23:38:40.595273 ARP, Reply 10.0.0.1 is-at 00:00:00:00:00:01 (oui 
Ethernet), length 28 
23:38:41.595261 ARP, Reply 10.0.0.1 is-at 00:00:00:00:00:01 (oui 
Ethernet), length 28 
23:38:42.568291 ARP, Reply 10.0.0.1 is-at 00:00:00:00:00:01 (oui 
Ethernet), length 28 
Figure 8.10: Network Traffic from Another Tenant
Providing isolation between virtual networks is a key security requirement for any network
hypervisor. Our example shows that this is not provided in OVX, and an attacker can observe
traffic from another network, thereby potentially revealing sensitive information.
8.7.3 Ping of Death
As FlowVisor, OVX is vulnerable to a ’Ping of Death’ attack, in which a single malformed
LLDP packet results in a fatal system error, i.e. a system crash that completely stopped
OVX, and hence it brings the entire network down. As before, we found this vulnerability
using fuzz testing.
OVX expects all LLDP packets include a Switch ID field in the OpenNetw2 TLV with the ID
of a valid switch. If the Switch ID field is set to a value other than one of the existing switches
in the network, it will force OVX to restart, which causes all network configuration to be lost,
as shown in Figure 8.11. The consequences of this are essentially the same as in a system
crash.
In essence, these software bugs are coding errors, such as failure to properly parse received
packets, which should be caught by thorough code review and testing. The result of these
vulnerabilities can be extremely severe. OVX, for example, is part of the ONOS controller
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22:35:25.787 [pool-5-thread-145] ERROR SwitchChannelHandler - Error while 
processing message from switch DPID : 1, remoteAddr : /127.0.0.1:35596 
state ACTIVE 
java.lang.NullPointerException 
22:35:25.811 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - removing port 1 
22:35:25.812 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - removing port 2 
22:35:25.812 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - removing port 3 
22:35:25.813 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - removing port 4 
22:35:25.814 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - Removing 
physical link between 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01/3 and 
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02/3 
22:35:25.815 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  PhysicalSwitch - Switch 
disconnected 1  
22:35:25.816 [pool-5-thread-145] INFO  StatisticsManager - Stopping Stats 
collection thread for 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01 
22:35:25.818 [Thread-20] INFO  OVXPort - Cleaning up flowmods for sw 
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01 port 1 
22:35:25.820 [Thread-19] ERROR DBManager - Failed to remove from db: 
Write operation to server /127.0.0.1:27017 failed on database OVX 
22:35:25.825 [Thread-19] INFO  OVXPort - Cleaning up flowmods for sw 
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01 port 2 
22:35:25.836 [Thread-19] INFO  OVXPort - Cleaning up flowmods for sw 
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01 port 3 
22:35:26.421 [pool-5-thread-128] INFO  PhysicalSwitch - Switch connected 
with dpid 1, name 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01 and type Open vSwitch 
22:35:26.426 [pool-5-thread-129] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - Adding physical 
link between 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01/3 and 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02/3 
22:35:27.209 [pool-5-thread-131] INFO  PhysicalNetwork - Adding physical 
link between 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:02/3 and 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:01/3 
Figure 8.11: OpenVirteX Crash, Ping of Death
platform, which is a ’carrier-grade’ SDN controller and is widely used in large-scale networks.
Being able to disable such a network via the sending of a single message is definitively a
problem. This work hopefully provides the motivation for a more thorough code analysis and
testing of key SDN infrastructure components such as network hypervisors.
8.8 Conclusions
Network virtualisation is an essential service in SDN, and it provides a number of key bene-
fits. Given their critical position in the SDN architecture, representing a single point of failure,
the security analysis of SDN hypervisors is critical for the security and reliability of SDN in
general. In this chapter, we provided the results of our security analysis of FlowVisor and
OVX, the two most widely used SDN hypervisor platforms.
Our analysis found a number of new vulnerabilities in both FlowVisor and OVX, which allow
an attacker to significantly disrupt or disable networks, as demonstrated in our experiments.
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Given the increasingly critical role SDN hypervisors in large-scale networks, our findings
provide an important motivation for a more careful testing and analysis of hypervisor code,
prior to deployment in production systems.
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Conclusion
SDN is an important new networking paradigm with very large potential impact and is gain-
ing rapid adoption. Network security is absolutely critical, given the increased number and
sophistication of cyber attacks. While there has been a lot of research exploring SDN to
implement a range of security features and functionality, there has been a limited amount
of work exploring the security of the SDN platform itself. SDN provides a very different ap-
proach to managing network, with its logically centralised control plane. As a result, security
in SDN is potentially very different from security in traditional networks, with potentially new
attack vectors.
This thesis tries to address a gap in the SDN literature, by providing a security analysis of
the current SDN architecture and platforms. The aim was to thoroughly analyse the security
of critical SDN building blocks, services and components, such as Topology Discovery, ARP
handling, and network hypervisors. As a result, we have identified new, critical SDN security
vulnerabilities and attacks. For some of the vulnerabilities, we were able to demonstrate
the attacks and discuss and quantify the impact while for others, we were able to propose
efficient countermeasures and mitigation strategies.
For the critical SDN service of topology discovery (OFDP), which is a core component of
all current SDN controller platforms, we demonstrated the feasibility of topology poisoning
attacks, where an attacker can create fake links in a controller’s topology database. We pro-
posed a mitigation approach, which provides authentication and integrity protection to LLDP
packets, by adding a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). We demonstrated
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that the method is secure against replay attacks, and is computationally efficient.
We have further discussed how current ARP handling approaches in SDN are vulnerable
to ARP spoofing attacks. As an initial solution, we have adopted Dynamic ARP Inspection
(DAI) mechanism, used in traditional networks to detect and mitigate ARP spoofing attacks
through relying on a trusted database of IP-to-MAC address mappings, to the SDN archi-
tecture. By leveraging the key features of SDN, such as centralised nature of the control
plane functionality, we have also developed a novel SDN-specific method, which does not
require a trusted database of IP-to-MAC address mappings. Instead, it sanitises potentially
spoofed fields of ARP requests and replies. This method prevents ARP spoofing attacks
from poisoning the end-host ARP caches and ARP handling approaches. It significantly
achieves better network performance compared to the current state-of-the-art ARP handling
components without security and imposes a minimal control CPU load.
While exploring ARP handling in SDN, we have discovered a new, significantly more efficient
method of ARP handling in SDN. By offloading ARP handling functionality from the control
plane to the data plane, we achieved an order of magnitude reduction in the ARP response
time, as well as a significant reduction in the computational overhead at the controller. This
has the important side effect of making the SDN controller more resilient against resource
exhaustion attacks. Furthermore, we have investigated a range of Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks against the SDN architecture, both the control plane and the data plane. We have
demonstrated the attacks, and have analysed and quantified their impact on different modern
SDN controller platforms. Our experiments have shown that an attacker can successfully
disrupt the operation of an OpenFlow-enabled network with DoS attacks, using relatively
modest resources.
Finally, the thesis presents an evaluation of the security of the network virtualisation layer
in SDN, i.e. network hypervisors. We specifically considered FlowVisor and OpenVirteX,
the two most important SDN hypervisors in terms of practical relevance. Using simple tech-
niques such as code analysis and fuzz testing, we have identified a number of new, critical
vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to disrupt an entire network, as well as break the iso-
lation between virtual networks. We hope this work provides the required motivation for
future work in this space. If SDN is to be widely adopted, the security of its infrastructure is
absolutely critical.
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While this thesis made significant steps towards securing and protecting the SDN architec-
ture from various attack types, more investigation needs to be done. Critical areas of future
work include providing a higher degree of resilience to DoS attacks, as well as securing
critical SDN components such as network hypervisors.
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